In this Appendix, we allow the receiver to make a choice among multiple actions. We characterize the implementable receiver's interim utilities and show that the sender can generally implement a strictly larger set of the receiver's interim utilities by persuasion mechanisms than by experiments. We also formulate the sender's optimization problem and show that the sender can achieve a strictly higher expected utility by persuasion mechanisms than by experiments.

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Supplement to "Progressive Learning"

This Online Appendix to the paper titled “Progressive Learning” presents the proof of Lemma 0, an extension of our equilibrium characterization allowing for mixed strategies, an analysis of the full commitment case, and details for Example 4 showing that path dependence can arise when shocks are ergodic.

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Quantitative Economics

Journal Of The Econometric Society

Supplemental Material

Quantitative Economics - Volume 8, Issue 3

Supplement to "Latent indices in assortative matching models"

Supplement to "Latent indices in assortative matching models"

Supplement to "Determining the number of groups in latent panel structures with an application to income and democracy"

Supplement to "Determining the number of groups in latent panel structures with an application to income and democracy"

Supplement to "Determining the number of groups in latent panel structures with an application to income and democracy"

Supplement to "Determining the number of groups in latent panel structures with an application to income and democracy"

Supplement to "Does redistribution increase output? The centrality of labor supply"

Supplement to "Does redistribution increase output? The centrality of labor supply"

Supplement to "Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions"

Supplement to "Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions"

Supplement to "Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions"

Supplement to "How to solve dynamic stochastic models computing expectations just once"

Supplement to "How to solve dynamic stochastic models computing expectations just once"

Supplement to "How to solve dynamic stochastic models computing expectations just once"

Supplement to "How to solve dynamic stochastic models computing expectations just once"

Supplement to "Dynamic skill accumulation, education policies, and the return to schooling"

Supplement to "Dynamic skill accumulation, education policies, and the return to schooling"

Supplement to "Dynamic skill accumulation, education policies, and the return to schooling"

Supplement to "Dynamic skill accumulation, education policies, and the return to schooling"

Supplement to "Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: Implications for equity and efficiency"

Supplement to "Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: Implications for equity and efficiency"

Supplement to "Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: Implications for equity and efficiency"

Supplement to "Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: Implications for equity and efficiency"

Supplement to "The distribution of wealth and the marginal propensity to consume"

Supplement to "The distribution of wealth and the marginal propensity to consume"

Supplement to "The distribution of wealth and the marginal propensity to consume"

Supplement to "The distribution of wealth and the marginal propensity to consume"

Supplement to "A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games"

Supplement to "A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games"

Supplement to "A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games"

Supplement to "Measuring the willingness‐to‐pay for others' consumption: An application to joint decisions of children"

Supplement to "Measuring the willingness‐to‐pay for others' consumption: An application to joint decisions of children"

Supplement to "Uncertainty and Unemployment"

Supplement to "Uncertainty and Unemployment"

Supplement to "Sales Force and Competition in Financial Product Markets: The Case of Mexico’s Social Security Privatization"

Supplement to "Sales Force and Competition in Financial Product Markets: The Case of Mexico’s Social Security Privatization"

Supplement to "Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture"

Supplement to "Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture"

Supplement to "EXcess Idle Time"

Supplement to "EXcess Idle Time"

Supplement to "Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production"

Supplement to "Value of Persistent Information"

Supplement to "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver"

Supplement to "Progressive Learning"

Supplement to "The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia"

Supplement to "The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia"

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