The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
This document has three parts. The first part analyzes generalizations of our model to downward-sloping demand, imperfect substitutes, Cournot competition, and nonlinear cost functions. The second part describes a general dynamic programming approach to games with serially correlated private information. The third part establishes conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with productive efficiency for perfectly persistent types, and also includes an analysis of severe "belief threat" punishments.
Appendix A presents the survey questions asked of subjects in Parts I and IV of the experiment, as well as the data coding for responses. These are all translations of the original Danish, available on request. Appendix B: Sample Design. Appendix C: Experimenter Script. Appendix D: Data and Statistical Analysis. Appendix E: Theoretical Notes.
The statistical modeling is implemented using version 10.0 of Stata. Contains all data files and Statacommand files.
This document outlines supplementary results and includes all notation, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
This zip file contains two MATLAB data files, a Stata data file, three Stata do files, and two MATLAB m files.
