Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Home> Econometrica> Issues> Supplemental Materials>Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization

Econometrica: Jul, 1986, Volume 54, Issue 4

Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912837
p. 785-806

Douglas Gale

A model of decentralized exchange and price formation is defined using the bargaining theory of A. Rubinstein. Agents meet at random and bargain over the terms of trade. If there are no transaction costs, every perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game implements a Walrasian equilibrium of the underlying exchange economy.

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