Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Home> Econometrica> Issues> Supplemental Materials>Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions

Econometrica: Nov, 1980, Volume 48, Issue 7

Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911923
p. 1585-1593

David Schmeidler

This note provides a rigorous description of a game in a strategic form whose Nash equilibria are all strong equilibriaccoinciding with the Walras equilibria of the underlying Arrow-Breau pure exchange economy.

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