Front Matter

The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

David Levine, Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin
p. 997-1039

Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information

Aldo Rustichini, Mark A. Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams
p. 1041-1063

Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment

Christophe Chamley, Douglas Gale
p. 1065-1085

Adaptive Learning with Nonlinear Dynamics Driven by Dependent Processes

Chung-Ming Kuan, Halbert White
p. 1087-1114

The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing

Luis M. B. Cabral, Michael H. Riordan
p. 1115-1140

Equivalence of Games and Markets

Myrna Holtz Wooders
p. 1141-1160

Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions

Charles Blackorby, David Donaldson, Walter Bossert
p. 1161-1178

Discrete and Continuous Choice, Max-Stable Processes, and Independence from Irrelevant Attributes

John K. Dagsvik
p. 1179-1205

The Large Sample Correspondence between Classical Hypothesis Tests and Bayesian Posterior Odds Tests

Donald W. K. Andrews
p. 1207-1232

Notes and Comments: Uncertain Lifetime, The Theory of the Consumer, and the Life Cycle Hypothesis

Siu Fai Leung
p. 1233-1239

Announcements

p. 1241-1248

News Notes

p. 1249-1250

Back Matter