Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Mar, 2012, Volume 80, Issue 2

Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9589
p. 883-903

James C. Cox, Duncan James

We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with a clock format unravel, as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two‐player tree‐format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock‐format Dutch auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auctions.


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Supplemental Material

Supplement to "Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games"

A PDF file containing 8 sets of instructions for each of the 8 treatments.

Supplement to "Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games"

A zip file containing the replication files for the manuscript.

Supplement to "Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games"

An appendix showing the evolution of play at the very beginning and very end of the experiments by means of histograms.