Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Nov, 1993, Volume 61, Issue 6

t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951646
p. 1355-1365

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

A social welfare function $f$ is Arrovian if it has transitive values and satisfies Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. For any fraction $t$ and any Arrovian social welfare function $f$, either there will be some individual who dictates on a subset containing at least the fraction $t$ of outcomes, or at least the fraction $1 - t$ of the ordered pairs of outcomes have their social ranking fixed independently of individual preference. If individual preferences are strong, we can say more: Associated with any Arrovian social welfare function, there is a set containing a large fraction of citizens whose preferences are not consulted in determining the social ranking of a large fraction of the pairs of alternatives. (The Pareto criterion is not assumed.)


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