SUPPLEMENT TO
"RANDOM VOTES TO PARTIES
AND POLICIES IN COALITION GOVERNMENTS"

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Faculty of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen - Bolzano

FIGURE A1.—A ballot-order effect by years. Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of random treatment of each party estimated as in equation (E1) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates (see Table I). *Dependent variables*: The dependent variable is the party share of votes within coalitions. *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is randomly located in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. The treatment is interacted with each calendar year fixed effect. Each dot is the coefficient measuring the effect of the treatment in each year. *Sample*: the different sub-figures report the estimates using the sample of all ruling coalitions containing the respective party. Coefficients in red (green) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels, respectively. The bars illustrate confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level.

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Paolo Roberti: paolo.roberti@unibz.it

FIGURE A2.—Robustness check: heterogeneous effects of treatment. Notes: The figure depicts the point estimates of the effect of random treatment on the share of votes within ruling coalitions. The graph reports coefficient estimates of random treatment of each party estimated as in equation (E1) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates (see Table I). *Dependent variables*: The dependent variable is the party share of votes within coalitions. *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is randomly located in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. The first dot reports the estimated effect for the sample above the median (e.g., university rate above the median) while the second is below the median. The dashed vertical line represents the average effect as from Table I column (4). The pair of orange points represent the cases in which one of the two coefficients is statistically different from the other. The bars illustrate confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level.

TABLE AI

A BALLOT-ORDER EFFECT (ALL PARTIES).

Dep. Variable:	Share of Votes w/i Coalition					
Coalition:	Any		Ruling		Non-Ruling	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated Party	2.514	2.515	2.392	2.393	2.624	2.630
	(0.402)	(0.411)	(0.563)	(0.591)	(0.542)	(0.567)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Municipalities FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Mean Dependent	18.03	18.03	16.21	16.21	19.98	19.98
Observations	13,564	13,564	6790	6790	6774	6774
N. Elections	1209	1209	1160	1160	1001	1001
N. Municipalities	605	605	589	589	550	550
R-Square	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.16

Note: The dependent variable is the party share of votes within coalitions. See Table V.I for details and Table AXXIV for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. The sample includes coalitions with more than two running parties in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the legislature level in parentheses.

(a) LEFT

(b) CENTER-LEFT

(c) CENTER-RIGHT

(d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A3.—Distribution of parties in ruling coalitions in Italy. The maps report the geographical distribution of the treated (dark color) and control group (light color) for the four main blocks of national parties.

TABLE AII

BALANCE TESTS: LEFT PARTY.

	Control Group		Treated Group		(1)	(2)	
	mean	SD	mean	SD	*p*-value	*p*-value	obs.
Panel A. Time-Invariant Geographical Characteristics							
Municipal Area (Km^2)	105.86	129.00	96.69	112.75	0.45	0.66	462
Urbanization	2.41	0.63	2.41	0.55	0.91	0.43	462
Seismicity	2.88	0.94	2.88	0.92	1.00	0.67	462
Sea Distance	49.08	45.54	58.83	46.98	0.03	0.20	462
River	0.63	0.48	0.65	0.48	0.65	0.88	462
Any Water Course	0.50	0.50	0.57	0.50	0.11	0.13	462
Seaside City	0.26	0.44	0.21	0.41	0.20	0.65	462
Share of Mountains	12.78	27.62	10.63	27.03	0.42	0.49	462
Altitude	273.45	242.97	256.94	250.88	0.49	0.75	462
Population	64,704.86	183,159.96	52,959.27	98,464.60	0.45	0.84	462
Panel B. Mayors Characteristics							
Age	49.52	8.28	49.17	8.65	0.66	0.66	462
Schooling	16.23	2.64	16.05	2.74	0.48	0.87	462
Women	0.09	0.29	0.15	0.36	0.08	0.21	462
Employees	0.30	0.46	0.31	0.47	0.74	0.91	462
Professional	0.60	0.49	0.54	0.50	0.27	0.59	462
Second Term Mayor	0.29	0.45	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.28	462
Panel C. Electoral Outcomes							
Turnout	75.87	5.85	74.92	6.62	0.11	0.29	462
Percentage Votes Mayor	53.98	11.52	52.93	11.97	0.36	0.93	462
Run-off	0.34	0.48	0.38	0.49	0.40	0.99	462
Run-off Alliances	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.24	0.94	0.84	462
Run-off Alliances with Seats	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.19	0.98	0.88	462
Minority Ruling Coalition	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.11	0.31	0.18	462
Total Potential Voters	55,602.69	162,241.80	45,180.27	82,175.24	0.44	0.82	462
Total Seats of the Concil	26.47	7.42	24.72	6.91	0.01	0.19	462

Note: Variables description and data sources are reported in Table V.II. For each variable, means and standard deviations in both the control group and the treatment group are reported. Column (1) reports the *p*-value of the test on the equality of means; column (2) reports the *p*-values of the treatment coefficient of a regression which includes as control only the number of running parties fixed effect, as from equation (E1).

TABLE AIII

BALANCE TESTS: CENTER-LEFT PARTY.

	Control Group		Treated Group		(1)	(2)	
	mean	SD	mean	SD	*p*-value	*p*-value	obs.
Panel A. Time-Invariant Geographical Characteristics							
Municipal Area (Km^2)	92.18	101.30	101.47	110.42	0.34	0.15	602
Urbanization	2.42	0.60	2.33	0.64	0.11	0.25	602
Seismicity	2.89	0.93	2.79	0.90	0.26	0.17	602
Sea Distance	53.33	48.42	50.21	43.24	0.48	0.14	602
River	0.63	0.48	0.67	0.47	0.36	0.86	602
Any Water Course	0.54	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.72	0.35	602
Seaside City	0.24	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.78	0.79	602
Share of Mountains	13.56	29.79	13.64	30.92	0.98	0.94	602
Altitude	285.00	284.55	242.24	236.95	0.09	0.06	602
Population	50,695.31	99,925.26	41,158.51	42,514.22	0.25	0.57	602
Panel B. Mayors Characteristics							
Age	49.48	8.63	49.10	8.84	0.63	0.15	602
Schooling	16.24	2.77	16.04	2.75	0.44	0.95	602
Women	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.31	0.43	0.44	602
Employees	0.28	0.45	0.33	0.47	0.25	0.41	602
Professional	0.63	0.48	0.55	0.50	0.10	0.24	602
Second Term Mayor	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.45	0.93	0.65	602
Panel C. Electoral Outcomes							
Turnout	75.99	6.26	76.15	5.40	0.78	0.25	602
Percentage Votes Mayor	52.22	11.93	50.73	11.71	0.18	0.96	602
Run-off	0.41	0.49	0.46	0.50	0.27	0.96	602
Run-off Alliances	0.08	0.27	0.08	0.27	0.98	0.85	602
Run-off Alliances with Seats	0.05	0.21	0.04	0.21	0.91	0.83	602
Minority Ruling Coalition	0.04	0.19	0.02	0.14	0.31	0.19	602
Total Potential Voters	43,101.89	82,245.60	35,186.01	35,550.75	0.24	0.59	602
Total Seats of the Concil	25.20	6.93	25.10	6.75	0.88	0.13	602

Note: Variables description and data sources are reported in Table V.II. For each variable, means and standard deviations in both the control group and the treatment group are reported. Column (1) reports the *p*-value of the test on the equality of means; column (2) reports the *p*-values of the treatment coefficient of a regression which includes as control only the number of running parties fixed effect, as from equation (E1).


FIGURE A4.—Ideological index of parties. The graph reports the ideological index computed in the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) by Volkens, Lehmann, Matthies, Merz, Regel, and Wesels (2018). *Ideology* is the Right-Left position of party: The sum of the following indexes of CMP: (per104 + per201 + per203 + per305 + per401 + per402 + per407 + per414 + per505 + per601 + per603 + per605 + per606) − (per103 + per105 + per106 + per107 + per403 + per404 + per406 + per412 + per413 + per504 + per506 + per701 + per202).

TABLE AIV

BALANCE TESTS: CENTER-RIGHT PARTY.

	Control Group		Treated Group		(1)	(2)	
	mean	SD	mean	SD	p-value	p-value	obs.
Panel A. Time-Invariant Geographical Characteristics							
Municipal Area (Km^2)	93.86	115.36	81.93	96.70	0.30	0.74	423
Urbanization	2.37	0.63	2.39	0.65	0.75	0.82	423
Seismicity	2.91	0.91	3.00	0.95	0.37	0.98	423
Sea Distance	42.61	48.40	53.52	55.16	0.04	0.42	423
River	0.45	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.81	0.98	423
Any Water Course	0.37	0.48	0.39	0.49	0.73	0.81	423
Seaside City	0.31	0.47	0.31	0.46	0.85	0.81	423
Share of Mountains	13.93	29.36	15.04	32.36	0.73	0.65	423
Altitude	288.62	276.60	287.64	277.11	0.97	0.85	423
Population	51,280.30	166,606.21	33,174.96	23,418.29	0.21	0.30	423
Panel B. Mayors Characteristics							
Age	50.86	9.24	51.07	8.88	0.83	0.74	423
Schooling	16.21	2.75	16.42	2.65	0.46	0.32	423
Women	0.04	0.21	0.07	0.26	0.21	0.37	423
Employees	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.40	0.86	0.83	423
Professional	0.73	0.44	0.72	0.45	0.84	0.99	423
Second Term Mayor	0.26	0.44	0.29	0.46	0.50	0.88	423
Panel C. Electoral Outcomes							
Turnout	77.00	5.56	76.12	6.08	0.14	0.21	423
Percentage Votes Mayor	51.03	9.54	50.07	10.15	0.35	0.44	423
Run-off	0.43	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.89	0.10	423
Run-off Alliances	0.14	0.35	0.11	0.32	0.45	0.12	423
Run-off Alliances with Seats	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.25	0.74	0.38	423
Minority Ruling Coalition	0.03	0.18	0.01	0.12	0.26	0.22	423
Total Potential Voters	44,734.53	150,272.21	28,610.12	20,001.32	0.22	0.28	423
Total Seats of the Concil	25.58	6.52	24.00	5.78	0.02	0.20	423

Note: Variables description and data sources are reported in Table V.II. For each variable, means and standard deviations in both the control group and the treatment group are reported. Column (1) reports the p-value of the test on the equality of means; column (2) reports the p-values of the treatment coefficient of a regression which includes as control only the number of running parties fixed effect, as from equation (E1).

TABLE AV

BALANCE TESTS: POPULIST RIGHT PARTY.

	Control Group		Treated Group		(1)	(2)	
	mean	SD	mean	SD	p-value	p-value	obs.
Panel A. Time-Invariant Geographical Characteristics							
Municipal Area (Km^2)	61.06	59.64	52.48	49.55	0.40	0.52	151
Urbanization	2.51	0.59	2.49	0.59	0.84	0.69	151
Seismicity	3.39	0.75	3.58	0.66	0.14	0.16	151
Sea Distance	87.22	52.94	99.77	52.48	0.19	0.34	151
River	0.81	0.40	0.84	0.37	0.65	0.36	151
Any Water Course	0.69	0.46	0.60	0.49	0.29	0.61	151
Seaside City	0.13	0.34	0.12	0.32	0.82	0.60	151
Share of Mountains	12.43	28.51	3.43	13.59	0.05	0.01	151
Altitude	303.07	326.51	252.02	188.24	0.34	0.12	151
Population	47,929.22	122,482.99	43,768.42	36,920.20	0.83	0.26	151
Panel B. Mayors Characteristics							
Age	51.09	9.60	47.63	10.28	0.05	0.52	151
Schooling	15.49	2.96	15.81	2.67	0.54	0.52	151
Women	0.06	0.25	0.07	0.26	0.91	0.84	151
Employees	0.20	0.40	0.14	0.35	0.36	0.25	151
Professional	0.69	0.46	0.74	0.44	0.55	0.37	151
Second Term Mayor	0.29	0.45	0.26	0.44	0.70	0.90	151
Panel C. Electoral Outcomes							
Turnout	74.37	5.05	73.05	4.47	0.14	0.16	151
Percentage Votes Mayor	51.52	8.82	51.78	7.15	0.86	0.85	151
Run-off	0.41	0.49	0.35	0.48	0.51	0.71	151
Run-off Alliances	0.12	0.33	0.12	0.32	0.94	0.92	151
Run-off Alliances with Seats	0.06	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.02	151
Minority Ruling Coalition	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.53	0.35	151
Total Potential Voters	40,588.48	100,311.84	37,285.26	30,713.94	0.83	0.26	151
Total Seats of the Concil	24.96	6.58	25.72	7.09	0.53	0.60	151

Note: Variables description and data sources are reported in Table V.II. For each variable, means and standard deviations in both the control group and the treatment group are reported. Column (1) reports the p-value of the test on the equality of means; column (2) reports the p-values of the treatment coefficient of a regression which includes as control only the number of running parties fixed effect, as from equation (E1).

TABLE AVI

BALANCE TESTS POLICIES PREVIOUS TERMS.

	Control Group		Treated Group		(1)	(2)	
	mean	SD	mean	SD	*p*-value	*p*-value	obs.
Panel A. Left Party							
Welfare	77.83	121.03	82.55	179.07	0.28	0.51	5606
Education	94.47	77.54	104.29	184.74	0.02	0.21	5606
Tax	176.02	234.93	183.93	381.52	0.39	0.74	5602
Security	42.88	135.34	39.17	41.94	0.13	0.35	5587
Panel B. Center-Left Party							
Welfare	79.16	179.93	77.30	34.87	0.48	0.90	7054
Education	94.62	136.70	98.25	76.90	0.16	0.28	7054
Tax	178.61	359.87	180.38	98.36	0.75	0.76	7050
Security	43.06	159.37	40.41	19.87	0.24	0.95	7034
Panel C. Center-Right Party							
Welfare	73.92	106.63	79.36	232.76	0.30	0.39	6680
Education	89.93	69.50	93.96	189.98	0.34	0.94	6680
Tax	171.79	209.03	182.01	474.38	0.34	0.57	6672
Security	43.91	119.04	43.52	176.70	0.93	0.62	6658
Panel D. Populist Right Party							
Welfare	100.55	294.17	90.71	30.03	0.20	0.38	2270
Education	127.41	284.86	120.76	48.78	0.38	0.51	2270
Tax	228.14	626.94	207.46	67.61	0.20	0.32	2266
Security	42.32	66.50	42.29	18.05	0.99	0.88	2267

Note: For each variable, means and standard deviations in both the control group and the treatment group are reported. Column (1) reports the *p*-value of the test on the equality of means; column (2) reports the *p*-values of the treatment coefficient of a regression, which includes as control only the number of running parties fixed effect, as from equation (E1).


FIGURE A5.—Heterogeneity analysis weak and affiliated mayor. Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of random treatment of each party estimated as in equation (E3) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates. The dependent variable is the log of per capita budgetary item on the salient policy area of each party (graph on the left), and the share of cabinet members affiliated to the main party (graph on the right). *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is randomly located in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. *Sample*: the different sub-figures report the estimates using the sample of all ruling coalitions containing the respective party. Coefficients in red (green) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels, respectively. The bars illustrate confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level. The treatment in the respective set of results is interacted with a dummy, taking values 1 if: the mayor was elected at run-off and zero otherwise; the mayor was affiliated with the treated party and zero otherwise.

TABLE AVII

VOTES RANDOMIZATION: OUTCOMES PAST ELECTION.

	Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Dependent Variable:				Share of Votes Previous Term				
Treated Party	0.067	0.032	0.258	0.277	0.688	0.694	0.030	1.546
	(0.288)	(0.287)	(1.136)	(0.892)	(1.034)	(1.048)	(2.109)	(1.846)
Mean Dependent	5.82	5.82	22.26	22.26	18.74	18.74	11.37	11.37
Observations	416	416	458	458	359	359	111	111
N. Elections	416	416	458	458	359	359	111	111
N. Municipalities	295	295	315	315	274	274	92	92
R-Square	0.23	0.34	0.32	0.62	0.21	0.32	0.39	0.65
Panel B. Dependent Variable:				Number of Seats Previous Term				
Treated Party	0.040	0.055	0.353	0.130	0.043	0.193	−0.215	0.615
	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.433)	(0.320)	(0.418)	(0.372)	(0.877)	(0.865)
Mean Dependent	1.27	1.27	6.97	6.97	5.47	5.47	3.08	3.08
Observations	416	416	458	458	359	359	111	111
N. Elections	416	416	458	458	359	359	111	111
N. Municipalities	295	295	315	315	274	274	92	92
R-Square	0.13	0.29	0.20	0.62	0.18	0.46	0.35	0.64
Panel C. Dependent Variable:				Being in the Ruling Coalition Previous Term				
Treated Party	0.066	0.032	0.007	0.018	−0.087	−0.062	0.082	0.062
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Mean Dependent	0.49	0.49	0.70	0.70	0.51	0.51	0.35	0.35
Observations	416	416	458	458	359	359	111	111
N. Elections	416	416	458	458	359	359	111	111
N. Municipalities	295	295	315	315	274	274	92	92
R-Square	0.12	0.26	0.20	0.38	0.12	0.35	0.28	0.63
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: The dependent variable is the party share of votes within a coalition during previous elections in Panel A, the number of seats obtained in the previous election in Panel B, and a dummy taking value 1 if the party was part of the ruling coalition the previous term. See Table V.I for details and Table AXXIV for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. Samples of coalitions, including: each of the main parties, with more than two running parties, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the legislature level in parentheses.

TABLE AVIII

MANIFESTO PROJECT DATA SET.

Label:	Id:	Description:
Welfare	per503	**Equality: Positive** Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people. This may include: (1) special protection for underprivileged social groups; (2) removal of class barriers; (3) need for fair distribution of resources; (4) the end of discrimination (e.g., racial or sexual discrimination).
	per504	**Welfare State Expansion** Favorable mentions of need to introduce, maintain, or expand any public social service or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of: (1) health care; (2) child care; (3) elder care and pensions; social housing.
Education	per506	**Education Expansion** Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels.
Tax	per401	**Free Market Economy** Favorable mentions of the free market and free market capitalism as an economic model. May include favorable references to: (1) laissez-faire economy; (2) superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; (3) private property rights; (4) personal enterprise and initiative; (4) need for unhampered individual enterprises.
Security	per104	**Military: Positive** The importance of external security and defense. May include statements concerning: (1) the need to maintain or increase military expenditure; (2) the need to secure adequate manpower in the military; (3) the need to modernize armed forces and improve military strength; (4) the need for rearmament and self-defense; (5) the need to keep military treaty obligations.

Note: Descriptions and information are from the Comparative Manifestos Project, CMP, by Volkens et al. (2018). *Source*: https: //manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets. The local electoral law did not change over the observation period until 2012, but a change in national electoral in 2009 led some national parties to re-brand party names without affecting the political manifesto. The *Center-Left* and *Center-Right* parties "Democratici di Sinistra" and "Forza Italia" were re-labeled "Partito Democratico" and "Il Popolo della Libertà," respectively. The *left-wing* block formed by "Partito dei Comunisti Italiani" and "Rifondazione Comunista" replaced by "Sinistra Ecologia Libertà." Finally, the *populist right* "Lega Nord" did not change its name during the period of analysis.

TABLE AIX

IMPACT OF VOTES TO PARTIES ON POLICY (WITHOUT LEFT PARTY).

Dep. Variable:	Fiscal Policy			Share of Votes			Fiscal Policy		
	ITT (1)	ITT (2)	ITT (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	IV (7)	IV (8)	IV (9)
Treated Party	0.107 (0.034)	0.104 (0.034)	0.102 (0.033)	2.622 (0.813)	2.622 (0.813)	2.489 (0.810)			
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition							0.041 (0.019)	0.040 (0.019)	0.041 (0.020)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE × Years FE	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Legislative Years FE	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
All Covariates	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓
F-statistic Instrument				10.40	10.40	9.44			
Observations	4086	4086	4086	4086	4086	4086	4086	4086	4086
N. Elections	787	787	787	787	787	787	787	787	787
N. Municipalities	507	507	507	507	507	507	507	507	507

Note: The dependent variable is the log of per capita budgetary item on the salient policy area of each party (see text for details). See Table V.I for details and Table AXXVI for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a given party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Share of votes w/i coalition is the party share of votes within the ruling coalition. Samples of coalitions, including: each of the main parties (but the left party), with more than two running parties, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.


(a) LEFT (b) CENTER-LEFT (c) CENTER-RIGHT (d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A6.—Treatment and Policies (correlation regressions). Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of the share of councilors obtained by each party (instead of the treatment dummy) as in equation (E1) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates. *Dependent variables*: log current expenditure per capita devoted to public social services (welfare); log current expenditure per capita devoted to public education (education); log revenues per capita from the real estate tax on home properties (Tax); log current expenditure per capita devoted to local police and justice services (security). *Share of Councilors w/i Coalition*: the seats obtained by the party over the total number of seats obtained by the parties of the coalition. *Sample*: the different sub-figures report the estimates using the sample of all ruling coalitions containing the respective party. Coefficients in red (green) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels, respectively. The bars illustrate confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level.

TABLE AX

IMPACT OF VOTES TO PARTIES ON POLICY (WEAK-IV).

Dep. Variable:	Fiscal Policy			Share of Votes			Fiscal Policy		
	ITT (1)	ITT (2)	ITT (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	IV (7)	IV (8)	IV (9)
Treated Party	0.079 (0.027)	0.075 (0.027)	0.058 (0.025)	3.508 (0.839)	3.508 (0.839)	2.879 (0.810)			
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition							0.021 (0.008)	0.021 (0.009)	0.020 (0.010)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE × Years FE	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Legislative Years FE	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
All Covariates	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓
Weak-IV 95% AR confidence set							0.005 0.038	0.004 0.038	0.000 0.040
F-statistic Instrument				17.47	17.47	12.62			
Observations	6598	6598	6598	6598	6598	6598	6598	6598	6598

Note: The dependent variable is the log of per capita budgetary item on the salient policy area of each party (see text for details). See Table V.I for details and Table AXXVI for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a given party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Share of votes w/i coalition is the party share of votes within the ruling coalition. Samples of coalitions, including: each of the main parties, with more than two running parties, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Weak-IV 95 percent Anderson–Rubin (AR) confidence sets are calculated using the two-step approach of Andrews (2018) using the Stata package from Sun (2018). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.

TABLE AXI

VOTES RANDOMIZATION: FIRST STAGE.

Panel A. Dependent Variable:	Share of Votes w/i Ruling Coalition							
	Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treated Party	1.834 (0.645)	2.012 (0.586)	5.677 (1.620)	4.462 (1.263)	3.386 (1.552)	4.360 (1.392)	6.095 (2.821)	5.630 (2.326)
Mean Dependent	8.82	8.82	44.43	44.43	42.45	42.45	19.10	19.10
Observations	2052	2052	2512	2512	1824	1824	679	679
N. Elections	452	452	593	593	409	409	142	142
N. Municipalities	323	323	397	397	306	306	116	116
F-test	8.09	11.79	12.27	12.48	4.76	9.81	4.67	5.86
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Legislative Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: The dependent variable is the party share of votes within coalitions. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes coalitions with more than two running parties, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the legislature level in parentheses.

TABLE AXII

SHARE OF VOTES AND POLICIES (IV SPECIFICATION).

	Welfare		Education		Tax		Security	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Sample A: Left Party								
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition	0.050	0.043	0.063	0.040	0.021	0.007	−0.005	0.001
	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Average Expenditure (p.c.)	129.79	129.79	75.94	75.94	190.04	190.04	47.65	47.65
Observations	2052	2052	2052	2052	1841	1841	2052	2052
N. Elections	1937	1937	1937	1937	1937	1937	1937	1937
N. Municipalities	323	323	323	323	323	323	323	323
Sample B: Center-Left Party								
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition	−0.004	−0.009	0.006	0.007	0.003	−0.002	−0.008	−0.011
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Average Expenditure (p.c.)	126.82	126.82	75.81	75.81	185.86	185.86	47.49	47.49
Observations	2512	2512	2512	2512	2187	2187	2512	2512
N. Elections	2356	2356	2356	2356	2356	2356	2356	2356
N. Municipalities	397	397	397	397	397	397	397	397
Sample C: Center-Right Party								
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition	−0.008	−0.013	0.004	−0.003	−0.025	−0.022	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Average Expenditure (p.c.)	115.79	115.79	65.49	65.49	173.11	173.11	50.64	50.64
Observations	1823	1823	1823	1823	1536	1536	1823	1823
N. Elections	1739	1739	1739	1739	1739	1739	1739	1739
N. Municipalities	306	306	306	306	306	306	306	306
Sample C: Populist Right Party								
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition	0.004	−0.023	0.005	−0.007	−0.004	−0.003	0.022	0.020
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Average Expenditure (p.c.)	154.76	154.76	85.07	85.07	200.20	200.20	47.28	47.28
Observations	679	679	679	679	567	567	679	679
N. Elections	658	658	658	658	658	658	658	658
N. Municipalities	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Legislative Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: The dependent variables are: log total current expenditure per capita devoted to public social services in columns (1) and (2); the log total current expenditure per capita devoted to public education in columns (3) and (4); the log total revenues per capita coming from the real estate tax on home property in columns (5) and (6); the log total current expenditure per capita devoted to local police and justice services in columns (7) and (8). See Table V.I for details and Table AXXVI for summary statistics. Share of Votes is the number of votes obtained by the party over the total number of votes obtained by the ruling coalition. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes ruling coalitions with more than two running parties in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Panel A refers to ruling coalitions which include the left party; Panel B refers to ruling coalitions which include the center-left party; Panel C refers to ruling coalitions which include the center-right party; Panel D refers to ruling coalitions which include the populist right party. Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. IV estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the legislature level in parentheses.

TABLE AXIII

RANDOMIZATION OF POLITICAL POWER: MAIN PARTIES (NON-RULING COALITIONS).

Ruling Coalition:	Main Parties		Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dep. Variable:	Share of Votes w/i Ruling Coalition									
Treated Party	1.689	1.668	0.923	0.525	4.421	3.868	0.989	1.449	1.822	2.337
	(0.804)	(0.760)	(1.079)	(1.071)	(1.871)	(1.783)	(1.459)	(1.406)	(2.575)	(2.542)
Mean Dependent	35.68	35.68	14.33	14.33	42.79	42.79	48.14	48.14	20.42	20.42
Observations	1204	1204	298	298	302	302	457	457	147	147
N. Elections	806	806	284	284	297	297	452	452	147	147
N. Municipalities	488	488	229	229	244	244	337	337	125	125
R-Square	0.67	0.73	0.44	0.56	0.40	0.51	0.29	0.48	0.55	0.73
Dep. Variable:	Share of Seats w/i Ruling Coalition									
Treated Party	3.276	3.155	0.573	0.195	8.699	8.079	3.559	2.565	0.667	1.161
	(1.417)	(1.401)	(2.375)	(2.594)	(3.311)	(3.285)	(2.383)	(2.458)	(4.171)	(4.323)
Mean Dependent	35.68	35.68	14.33	14.33	42.79	42.79	48.14	48.14	20.42	20.42
Observations	1204	1204	298	298	302	302	457	457	147	147
N. Elections	806	806	284	284	297	297	452	452	147	147
N. Municipalities	488	488	229	229	244	244	337	337	125	125
R-Square	0.56	0.59	0.09	0.25	0.25	0.36	0.20	0.32	0.40	0.59
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE × Years FE	✓	✓	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: The dependent variable is the party share of votes within a coalition in Panel A and the party share of seats within a coalition in Panel B. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. Samples of coalitions, including: each of the main parties, with more than two running parties, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the legislature level in parentheses.

(a) LEFT (b) CENTER-LEFT (c) CENTER-RIGHT (d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A7.—Random votes to parties and impact on policies (random inference—Stata command Ritest). Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of random treatment of each party estimated as in equation (E2) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates. *Dependent variables*: log current expenditure per capita devoted to public social services (welfare); log current expenditure per capita devoted to public education (education); log revenues per capita from the real estate tax on home properties (Tax); log current expenditure per capita devoted to local police and justice services (security). *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is randomly located in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. *Sample*: the different sub-figures report the estimates using the sample of all ruling coalitions containing the respective party. Coefficients in red (green) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels, respectively. The bars illustrate confidence intervals estimated with permutation on the basis of Monte Carlo simulations exploiting the STATA command Ritest by Heß (2017).

(a) LEFT (b) CENTER-LEFT (c) CENTER-RIGHT (d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A8.—Random votes to parties and impact on policies (random inference—Stata command Bootstrap). Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of random treatment of each party estimated as in equation (E2) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates. *Dependent variables*: log current expenditure per capita devoted to public social services (welfare); log current expenditure per capita devoted to public education (education); log revenues per capita from the real estate tax on home properties (Tax); log current expenditure per capita devoted to local police and justice services (security). *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is randomly located in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. *Sample*: the different sub-figures report the estimates using the sample of all ruling coalitions containing the respective party. Coefficients in red (green) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels, respectively. The bars illustrate non-parametric bootstrap estimation of confidence intervals exploiting the STATA command Bootstrap.

(a) LEFT   (b) CENTER-LEFT   (c) CENTER-RIGHT   (d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A9.—Treatment and policies (non-ruling coalitions). Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of random treatment of each party estimated as in equation (E2) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates. *Dependent variables*: log current expenditure per capita devoted to public social services (welfare); log current expenditure per capita devoted to public education (education); log revenues per capita from the real estate tax on home properties (Tax); log current expenditure per capita devoted to local police and justice services (security). *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is randomly located in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. *Sample*: the different sub-figures report the estimates using the sample of all non-ruling coalitions containing the respective party. Coefficients in red (green) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels, respectively. The bars illustrate confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level.

(a) LEFT   (b) CENTER-LEFT   (c) CENTER-RIGHT   (d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A10.—Treatment and cabinet members (non-ruling coalitions). Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of random treatment of each party estimated as in equation (E1) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates. The *dependent variables* are the average age of the cabinet members (in years); their average years of schooling; share of women; share of administrative employees; and share of professionals. *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. *Sample*: all non-ruling coalitions containing the respective party. The point represents the estimated coefficient of a regression that includes all the covariates described in Table V.II. Point estimates in red (respectively green) are significant at least at the 5% (respectively 10%) level with confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level.

TABLE AXIV

SUR MODEL.

	Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Dependent Variable:				Share of Votes w/i Ruling Coalition				
Treated Party	2.028	2.140	1.267	1.951	9.122	10.588	4.934	4.232
	(0.509)	(0.485)	(1.370)	(1.192)	(2.051)	(1.893)	(2.095)	(1.774)
Treated Party	−0.579	−0.981	−0.447	−0.505	−1.856	−5.456	−1.580	−0.308
	(1.259)	(1.087)	(0.564)	(0.545)	(2.123)	(1.660)	(2.205)	(2.209)
Mean Dependent	8.85	8.85	45.60	45.60	42.71	42.71	19.45	19.45
Observations	416	416	416	416	132	132	132	132
R-Square	0.23	0.33	0.56	0.69	0.36	0.55	0.46	0.71
Panel B. Dependent Variable:				Share of Seats w/i Ruling Coalition				
Treated Party	2.303	2.462	1.100	2.073	10.285	11.538	5.603	5.080
	(0.644)	(0.625)	(1.597)	(1.446)	(2.280)	(2.190)	(2.435)	(2.131)
Treated Party	−0.557	−1.126	−0.577	−0.644	−2.614	−6.400	−1.883	−0.755
	(1.467)	(1.317)	(0.711)	(0.699)	(2.461)	(1.998)	(2.455)	(2.527)
Mean Dependent	7.21	7.21	51.62	51.62	46.79	46.79	18.91	18.91
Observations	416	416	416	416	132	132	132	132
R-Square	0.17	0.25	0.55	0.66	0.35	0.51	0.42	0.67
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: In the first equation of the system, the dependent variable is the share of votes within coalition of the party treated (e.g., left party in columns (1) and (2)), while in the second equation, the dependent variable is the share of votes within coalition of the other main party of the coalition (e.g., center-left party in columns (1) and (2)). See Table V.I for details and Table AXXIV for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group samples of winning coalitions, including each of the main parties and with more than two running parties in municipalities with population larger than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXV

TREATMENT AND PROBABILITY THAT A COALITION WINS.

Dependent Variable:	Being in a Winning Coalition							
	Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treated Party	−0.000	0.008	0.000	0.004	0.049	0.024	−0.063	−0.058
	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.060)	(0.044)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Mean Dependent	0.62	0.62	0.67	0.67	0.48	0.48	0.54	0.54
Observations	763	763	904	904	879	879	298	298
N. Elections	720	720	892	892	865	865	296	296
N. Municipalities	449	449	523	523	514	514	206	206
R-Square	0.17	0.58	0.11	0.51	0.11	0.55	0.15	0.62

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayoral candidate, running with a coalition of parties that includes the party of interest, wins the election and zero otherwise. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. Samples of coalitions, including: each of the main parties, with more than two running parties, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXVI

VOTES RANDOMIZATION: MAIN PARTIES.

|	Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Dependent Variable:				Number of Councilors				
Treated Party	0.345	0.369	1.021	0.598	0.584	0.759	1.093	0.789
	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.365)	(0.243)	(0.396)	(0.291)	(0.443)	(0.411)
Mean Dependent	1.20	1.20	8.06	8.06	7.57	7.57	2.78	2.78
Observations	462	462	602	602	423	423	151	151
N. Elections	462	462	602	602	423	423	151	151
N. Municipalities	330	330	404	404	316	316	122	122
R-Square	0.14	0.30	0.24	0.69	0.20	0.61	0.32	0.60
Panel B. Dependent Variable:				Share of Seats w/i Ruling Coalition				
Treated Party	2.208	2.343	4.729	4.036	4.662	5.431	6.465	5.681
	(0.703)	(0.721)	(1.492)	(1.299)	(1.680)	(1.635)	(2.883)	(2.938)
Mean Dependent	7.21	7.21	51.62	51.62	46.79	46.79	18.91	18.91
Observations	462	462	602	602	423	423	151	151
N. Elections	462	462	602	602	423	423	151	151
N. Municipalities	330	330	404	404	316	316	122	122
R-Square	0.17	0.24	0.47	0.63	0.29	0.40	0.37	0.58
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: The dependent variable is number of seats obtained in the council in Panel A and the party share of seats within a coalition in Panel B. See Table V.I for details and Table AXXIV for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a given party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Samples of coalitions, including: each of the main parties, with more than two running parties, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

(a) Social Welfare

(b) Education/Culture

(c) Business Development

(d) Security

FIGURE A11.—Prototypical profiles of cabinet members by department: multi-dimensional profiles. Notes: Each dot represents the share of cabinet members with a given profile that is allocated to the different departments. For example, the 30% of the cabinet members that are males, older, and non-professional (MOO—(male (M), old (O), and non-professional members (O))) are assigned to the department of Education/Culture, 33% of them are assigned to the department of Social Welfare, 65% of them are assigned to the department of Business, and 14% of them are assigned to the department of Security Policy. Notice that the sum of these shares cannot be compared across departments (the sum would be more than 100%) because the same cabinet member can be responsible for more than one department (e.g., welfare and education). The squares indicate the two most frequent profiles. *Legend of Types*: MOO is an acronym that identifies male (M), old (O), and non-professional members (O). MYO is an acronym that identifies male (M), young (Y), and non-professional members (O). MYP is an acronym that identifies male (M), young (Y), and professional members (P). MOP is an acronym that identifies male (M), old (O), and professional members (P). FYO is an acronym that identifies female (F), young (Y), and non-professional members (O). FOO is an acronym that identifies female (F), old (O), and non-professional members (O). FYP is an acronym that identifies female (F), young (Y), and professional members (P). FOP is an acronym that identifies female (F), old (O), and professional members (P).

|			
(a) LEFT	(b) CENTER-LEFT	(c) CENTER-RIGHT	(d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A12.—Treatment and cabinet members (correlation regressions). Notes: The graph reports coefficient estimates of the share of councilors obtained by each party (instead of the treatment dummy) as in equation (E1) in fully conditioned empirical specifications that account for all fixed effects and covariates. The *dependent variables* are the average age of the cabinet members (in years); their average years of schooling; share of women; share of administrative employees; and share of professionals. *Share of Councilors w/i Coalition*: the seats obtained by the party over the total number of seats obtained by the parties of the coalition. *Sample*: all ruling coalitions containing the respective party. The point represents the estimated coefficient of a regression that includes all the covariates described in Table V.II. Point estimates in red (respectively green) are significant at least at the 5% (respectively 10%) level with confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level.

|			
(a) LEFT	(b) CENTER-LEFT	(c) CENTER-RIGHT	(d) POPULIST RIGHT

FIGURE A13.—Treatment of parties and features of cabinet members. Note: The graph reports coefficient estimates of equation (E1), which includes as control only the number of running parties fixed effect (first dot), and all the control but year fixed effect (second dot). The *dependent variables* are the share of cabinet members that are: elderly, educated; women; employees; and professionals. *Treated Party* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. *Sample*: all ruling coalitions containing the respective party. Point estimates in red (respectively green) are significant at least at the 5% (respectively 10%) level with confidence intervals at limit (10%) significance level.

TABLE AXVII

TREATMENT AND CABINET STABILITY.

	Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Dependent Variable:	Total Number of Cabinet Members							
Treated Party	−0.487	−0.374	0.643	0.226	0.252	0.360	0.747	−0.193
	(0.423)	(0.374)	(0.397)	(0.350)	(0.452)	(0.398)	(0.692)	(0.598)
Mean Dependent	10.61	10.61	9.91	9.91	10.54	10.54	9.28	9.28
Observations	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Elections	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Municipalities	262	262	328	328	252	252	113	113
R-Square	0.32	0.51	0.28	0.48	0.21	0.43	0.33	0.67
Panel B. Dependent Variable:	Share of Replaced Members of the Cabinet							
Treated Party	−0.006	−0.015	0.018	0.018	−0.004	−0.004	−0.011	−0.039
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.053)
Mean Dependent	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.33	0.33	0.26	0.26
Observations	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Elections	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Municipalities	262	262	328	328	252	252	113	113
R-Square	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.18	0.09	0.15	0.14	0.30
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of cabinet members in the municipality in Panel A and the share of replaced cabinet members during the legislature in Panel B. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. The sample includes coalitions with more than two running parties in municipalities, with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes coalitions for which we find information for at least one affiliated member (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXVIII

IMPACT ON CABINET MEMBERS AFFILIATED TO THE TREATED PARTY (ALL COALITIONS).

Dep. Variable	Share of Cabinet Members (Affiliated to)							
	Main Party		Other Parties		Non Affiliated		Non National Parties	
	ITT (1)	IV (2)	ITT (3)	IV (4)	ITT (5)	IV (6)	ITT (7)	IV (8)
Treated Party	0.031 (0.011)		−0.023 (0.015)		−0.008 (0.019)		−0.026 (0.014)	
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition		0.010 (0.004)		−0.007 (0.005)		-0.002 (0.006)		−0.008 (0.004)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE × Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
All Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-statistic Instrument		28.37		28.37		28.37		28.37
Mean Dependent	0.18	0.18	0.36	0.36	0.46	0.46	0.25	0.25
Observations	1622	1622	1622	1622	1622	1622	1622	1622
N. Elections	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075
N. Municipalities	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571
N. Cabinet Members	10,917	10,917	10,917	10,917	10,917	10,917	10,917	10,917

Note: The dependent variable is the share of cabinet members affiliated with the party of interest reported in the heading of the columns. See Table V.I for details and Table AXXVIII for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Share of votes w/i coalition is the party share of votes within the ruling coalition instrumented with the treatment. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes coalitions with more than two running parties in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXIX

IMPACT ON CABINET MEMBERS AFFILIATED TO THE TREATED PARTY (AT LEAST ONE AFFILIATED MEMBER).

Dep. Variable	Share of Cabinet Members (Affiliated to)							
	Main Party		Other Parties		Non Affiliated		Non National Parties	
	ITT (1)	IV (2)	ITT (3)	IV (4)	ITT (5)	IV (6)	ITT (7)	IV (8)
Treated Party	0.043 (0.012)		−0.029 (0.016)		−0.014 (0.017)		−0.032 (0.015)	
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition		0.013 (0.004)		−0.009 (0.005)		−0.004 (0.005)		−0.010 (0.005)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE × Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
All Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-statistic Instrument		25.30		25.30		25.30		25.30
Mean Dependent	0.21	0.21	0.42	0.42	0.38	0.38	0.29	0.29
Observations	1401	1401	1401	1401	1401	1401	1401	1401
N. Elections	925	925	925	925	925	925	925	925
N. Municipalities	531	531	531	531	531	531	531	531
N. Cabinet Members	9587	9587	9587	9587	9587	9587	9587	9587

Note: The dependent variable is the share of cabinet members affiliated with the party of interest reported in the heading of the columns. See Table V.I for details and Table AXXVIII for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Share of votes w/i coalition is the party share of votes within the ruling coalition instrumented with the treatment. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes coalitions (all main parties but the left Party) with more than two running parties in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). The sample includes coalitions for which we find information for at least one affiliated member (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXX

IMPACT ON CABINET MEMBERS AFFILIATED TO THE TREATED PARTY (WITHOUT LEFT PARTY).

Dep. Variable	Share of Cabinet Members (Affiliated to)							
	Main Party		Other Parties		Non Affiliated		Non National Parties	
	ITT (1)	IV (2)	ITT (3)	IV (4)	ITT (5)	IV (6)	ITT (7)	IV (8)
Treated Party	0.039 (0.013)		−0.027 (0.019)		−0.012 (0.019)		−0.035 (0.019)	
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition		0.011 (0.003)		−0.007 (0.005)		−0.003 (0.005)		−0.010 (0.005)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE × Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
All Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-statistic Instrument		21.68		21.68		21.68		21.68
Mean Dependent	0.16	0.16	0.53	0.53	0.31	0.31	0.33	0.33
Observations	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800
N. Elections	686	686	686	686	686	686	686	686
N. Municipalities	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440
N. Cabinet Members	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187

Note: The dependent variable is the share of cabinet members affiliated with the party of interest reported in the heading of the columns. See Table V.I for details and Table AXXVIII for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Share of votes w/i coalition is the party share of votes within the ruling coalition instrumented with the treatment. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes coalitions (all main parties but the left party) with more than two running parties in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). The sample includes coalitions for which we find information for at least 20% of affiliated members (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXXI

ACCESS TO POLICY SETTING: IMPACT ON AFFILIATED CABINET MEMBERS (AT LEAST 20% OF AFFILIATED INFORMATION).

	Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Populist R.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Dependent Variable:	Number of Affiliated Cabinet Members							
Treated Party	0.237	0.237	0.925	0.788	0.361	0.481	0.753	0.698
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.255)	(0.242)	(0.272)	(0.261)	(0.213)	(0.228)
Mean Dependent	0.66	0.66	3.16	3.16	2.88	2.88	0.98	0.98
Observations	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Elections	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Municipalities	262	262	328	328	252	252	113	113
R-Square	0.12	0.25	0.12	0.29	0.13	0.31	0.28	0.50
Panel B. Dependent Variable:	Share of Affiliated Cabinet Members							
Treated Party	0.032	0.034	0.073	0.074	0.037	0.043	0.084	0.092
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Mean Dependent	0.07	0.07	0.33	0.33	0.28	0.28	0.11	0.11
Observations	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Elections	345	345	444	444	325	325	130	130
N. Municipalities	262	262	328	328	252	252	113	113
R-Square	0.14	0.23	0.11	0.17	0.11	0.22	0.35	0.53
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years FE	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
All Covariates	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓

Note: The dependent variable is the number of affiliated cabinet members (share) with the party of interest. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. Share of votes w/i coalition is the party share of votes within the ruling coalition instrumented with the treatment. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes coalitions with more than two running parties in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXXII

FEATURES OF CABINET MEMBERS AFFILIATED TO THE TREATED PARTY (WITHOUT LEFT PARTY).

Dep. Variable	Features of Cabinet Members (Affiliated to)									
	Whole Cabinet		Main Party		Other Parties		Non Affiliated		Non National Parties	
	ITT (1)	IV (2)	ITT (3)	IV (4)	ITT (5)	IV (6)	ITT (7)	IV (8)	ITT (9)	IV (10)
Treated Party	0.041 (0.015)		0.027 (0.009)		0.009 (0.015)		0.005 (0.012)		−0.009 (0.011)	
Sh. of Votes w/i Coalition		0.011 (0.005)		0.008 (0.002)		0.002 (0.004)		0.001 (0.003)		−0.003 (0.003)
# Running Parties FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coal. FE × Years FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
All Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-statistic Instrument		21.68		21.68		21.68		21.68		21.68
Mean Dependent	0.54	0.54	0.09	0.09	0.29	0.29	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.10
Observations	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800
N. Elections	686	686	686	686	686	686	686	686	686	686
N. Municipalities	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	627	440
N. Cabinet Members	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187	8187

Note: The dependent variable is the share of cabinet members with the salient features of each main party. See Table V.I for details and Table AXXIX for summary statistics. Treated Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point on the ballot paper and zero otherwise. The IV estimates votes w/i coalition is the party share of votes within the ruling coalition. Mean Dependent is the average of the dependent variable for the control group. The sample includes coalitions (all main parties but the left party) with more than two running parties in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants in the period 2002–2012 (see text for details). The sample includes coalitions for which we find information for at least 20% affiliated members (see text for details). Description of covariates, data sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables V.II and AXXIII. OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE AXXIII

SUMMARY STATISTICS: COVARIATES.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Geographic Covariates:					
Municipal Area	605	93	113	1.6	1308
Urbanization	605	2.4	0.63	1	3
Seismicity	605	2.9	0.92	1	4
Sea Distance	605	49	48	0.66	206
River	605	0.56	0.5	0	1
Any Water Course	605	0.46	0.5	0	1
Seaside City	605	0.26	0.44	0	1
Share of Mountains	605	14	31	0	100
Average Altitude	605	285	274	0.5	1845
Population	605	48,171	131,992	10,244	2,546,804
Mayors Characteristics:					
Age	1209	50	8.9	27	74
Schooling	1209	16	2.8	5	21
Women	1209	0.077	0.27	0	1
Employees	1209	0.25	0.43	0	1
Professional	1209	0.65	0.48	0	1
Second Term Mayor	1209	0.28	0.45	0	1
Electoral Covariates:					
Turnout	1209	76	6	56	93
Percentage of Votes (Mayor)	1209	43	11	13	89
Run-off	1209	0.43	0.49	0	1
Run-off Alliances	1209	0.09	0.23	0	1
Run-off Alliances with Seats	1209	0.046	0.15	0	1
Minority Ruling Coalition	1209	0.026	0.16	0	1
Total Potential Voters	1209	42,298	117,185	7999	2,347,502
Total Seats of The Council	1209	25	6.8	16	60

Note: Description of covariates and data sources in Table V.II.

TABLE AXXIV

SUMMARY STATISTICS: ALL PARTIES.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
			Full Sample		
Share of Votes w/i Coalition	13,564	19	18	0.037	92
Share of Seats w/i Coalition	13,564	18	24	0	100
Number of Councilors	13,564	1.9	2.9	0	39
At Least a Councilor	13,564	0.62	0.49	0	1
			Ruling Coalition		
Share of Votes w/i Coalition	6790	17	17	0.037	92
Share of Seats w/i Coalition	6790	17	20	0	100
Number of Councilors	6790	2.7	3.4	0	35
At Least a Councilor	6790	0.75	0.44	0	1
			Non Ruling Coalition		
Share of Votes w/i Coalition	6790	17	17	0.037	92
Share of Seats w/i Coalition	6790	17	20	0	100
Number of Councilors	6790	2.7	3.4	0	35
At Least a Councilor	6790	0.75	0.44	0	1
			Left Party		
Share of Votes w/i Coalition	462	9.6	5.8	1	60
Share of Seats w/i Coalition	462	7.9	6.9	0	61
Number of Councilors	462	1.3	1.1	0	11
At Least a Councilor	462	0.77	0.42	0	1
			Center-Left Party		
Share of Votes w/i Coalition	602	48	19	4.6	90
Share of Seats w/i Coalition	602	54	21	0	100
Number of Councilors	602	8.4	4.2	0	23
At Least a Councilor	602	1	0.058	0	1
			Center-Right Party		
Share of Votes w/i Coalition	423	45	16	5.8	92
Share of Seats w/i Coalition	423	49	17	0	100
Number of Councilors	423	7.7	4	0	35
At Least a Councilor	423	1	0.049	0	1
			Populist Right Party		
Share of Votes w/i Coalition	151	21	16	0.29	84
Share of Seats w/i Coalition	151	21	18	0	92
Number of Councilors	151	3.1	2.5	0	11
At Least a Councilor	151	0.81	0.4	0	1

Note: Description of covariates and data sources in Table V.I.

TABLE AXXV

SUMMARY STATISTICS: COUNCIL AND CABINET.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Total Seats of the Council	1209	25	6.8	16	60
Total Number of Cabinet Members	1075	10	4.3	1	33
Average Number of Parties in the Council	1209	5.5	1.6	3	18

TABLE AXXVI

SUMMARY STATISTICS: POLICIES.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
	Left Party					Center-Left Party				
Welfare	2052	132	89	0.74	2179	2512	128	84	0.74	2179
Education	2052	79	36	4.3	209	2512	46	35	3.4	207
Tax	1683	190	86	0	592	1944	186	85	0	592
Security	2052	46	23	1.5	195	2512	47	24	0	272
	Center-Right Party					Populist Right Party				
Welfare	1823	117	63	6.7	428	679	155	54	45	384
Education	1823	66	28	4.6	259	679	50	28	4.6	190
Tax	1355	170	75	0	711	479	198	65	58	528
Security	1823	50	25	1.5	289	679	49	20	1.5	134

Note: The table includes summaries about the level of public spending per capita of the four main items in the four sub-samples of the ruling coalitions in which the main party is present.

TABLE AXXVII

SUMMARY STATISTICS: CABINET MEMBERS FEATURES.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
	Left Party					Center-Left Party				
Elderly	458	0.51	0.19	0	1	599	0.41	0.19	0	1
Degree Holders	458	0.55	0.21	0	1	599	0.56	0.21	0	1
Women	458	0.25	0.15	0	0.8	599	0.25	0.16	0	0.8
Employees	458	0.41	0.21	0	1	599	0.41	0.2	0	1
Professional	458	0.29	0.2	0	1	599	0.31	0.2	0	1
	Center-Right Party					Populist Right Party				
Elderly	416	0.52	0.19	0	1	149	0.28	0.2	0.11	1
Degree Holders	416	0.54	0.21	0	1	149	0.47	0.19	0	1
Women	416	0.13	0.11	0	0.6	149	0.16	0.11	0	0.5
Employees	416	0.28	0.17	0	0.82	149	0.31	0.19	0	0.83
Professional	416	0.46	0.2	0	1	149	0.45	0.19	0	0.9

Note: The table includes summaries about the cabinet members' features in the four sub-samples of the ruling coalitions in which the main party is present.

TABLE AXXVIII

SUMMARY STATISTICS: CABINET MEMBER AFFILIATION.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
			Left Party					Center-Left Party		
Share of Cabinet Members Affiliated to Main Party	345	0.078	0.097	0	0.56	444	0.35	0.23	0	1
Share of Cabinet Members Affiliated to Other Parties	345	0.59	0.24	0	1	444	0.27	0.24	0	1
Share of Cabinet Members Non Affiliated	345	0.33	0.25	0	0.79	444	0.31	0.26	0	0.79
Share of Cabinet Members Affiliated to Non National Parties	345	0.27	0.24	$-4.5e-08$	1	444	0.28	0.25	0	1
			Center-Right Party					Populist Right Party		
Share of Cabinet Members Affiliated to Main Party	325	0.3	0.21	0	0.92	130	0.12	0.14	0	0.57
Share of Cabinet Members Affiliated to Other Parties	325	0.41	0.23	0	1	130	0.37	0.25	0	1
Share of Cabinet Members Non Affiliated	325	0.29	0.24	0	0.79	130	0.25	0.22	0	0.78
Share of Cabinet Members Affiliated to Non National Parties	325	0.37	0.25	0	1	130	0.31	0.3	0	1

Note: The table includes summaries about the cabinet members' affiliation in the four sub-samples of the ruling coalitions in which the main party is present. In the left party sample, the center-left party is a coalition partner in 90 percent of the observations. In the center-left party sample, the left party is a coalition partner in 64 percent of the observations. In the center-right party sample, the populist right party is a coalition partner in 34 percent of the observations. In the populist right party sample, the center-right party is a coalition partner in 80 percent of the observations.

TABLE AXXIX

SUMMARY STATISTICS: SHARE OF SALIENT FEATURES OF CABINET MEMBERS.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
			Left Party					Center-Left Party		
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in the Whole Cabinet	345	0.51	0.19	0	1	444	0.17	0.2	0	1
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in the Main Party	345	0.04	0.076	0	0.5	444	0.15	0.15	0	0.75
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in Other Parties	345	0.31	0.19	0	1	444	0.14	0.15	0	1
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in Non Affiliated	345	0.17	0.16	0	0.67	444	0.12	0.15	0	0.75
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in Non National Parties	345	0.12	0.15	0	0.78	444	0.068	0.12	0	1
			Center-Right Party					Populist Right Party		
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in the Whole Cabinet	325	0.46	0.19	0	1	130	0.13	0.11	0.5	1
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in the Main Party	325	0.15	0.14	0	0.67	130	0.11	0.12	0	0.5
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in Other Parties	325	0.19	0.17	0	0.89	130	0.52	0.24	0	1
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in Non Affiliated	325	0.13	0.14	0	0.56	130	0.2	0.2	0	0.77
Share of C.M. with Salient Feature in Non National Parties	325	0.041	0.11	0	0.86	130	0.19	0.23	0	1

Note: The table includes summaries about the share of cabinet members with the features in the four sub-samples of the ruling coalitions in which the main party is present (see text for details).

TABLE V.I

VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND DATA SOURCES: MAIN VARIABLES.

Treated Party. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the party is in the focal point in the ballot paper and zero otherwise.

Sources: The position of party in the ballot paper has been retrieved and elaborated by the authors from raw data on the graphical structure of ballot papers kindly supplied upon request by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

TABLE V.I

Continued.

Electoral Outcomes:

Share of Votes w/i Coalition. The votes obtained by the party over the total number of votes obtained by the parties of the coalition.

Share of Councilors w/i Coalition. The seats obtained by the party over the total number of seats obtained by the parties of the coalition.

Sources: Electoral covariates are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Election Archive. See http://elezionistorico.interno.it/.

Policy Outcomes:

Welfare. Total current expenditure per capita on public social services as defined by Italian Ministry of the Internal Affairs ("*Funzioni del Settore Sociale*").

Education. Total current expenditure per capita on public education as defined by Italian Ministry of the Internal Affairs ("*Funzioni di Istruzione Pubblica*").

Tax. Total revenues per capita coming from the real estate tax on home property ("*Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili*, ICI").

Security. Total current expenditure per capita on local police and justice services ("*Funzioni di Polizia Locale e Funzioni Relative alla Giustizia*").

Sources: Fiscal variables are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Financial Reports (Section "Quadro 2" for taxes and Section "Quadro 4" for chapters of expenditure). See http://finanzalocale.interno.it/apps/floc.php/in/cod/4.

Cabinet Members:

Number (Share) of Cabinet Members Affiliated. The seats obtained in the cabinet by the party of interest over the total number of cabinet members.

Culture & Education Share of cabinet members assigned to the department (policy area) of culture and education.

Social Welfare & Environmental Share of cabinet members assigned to the department (policy area) of social welfare and environmental.

Business Development Share of cabinet members assigned to the department (policy area) of business development. This category groups four different departments: urban planning, public works, productive activities, budget.

Security Policies. Share of cabinet members assigned to the department (policy area) of security policies.

Sources: Electoral covariates are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Election Archive. See http://elezionistorico.interno.it/. Openpolis (http://www.openpolis.it) is a public foundation that aims at making citizens aware of its representatives and that, among others, collects data on politicians appointed at all levels of government including municipal cabinet members.

Characteristics of Politicians:

Age. The average age.

Schooling. The average years of schooling.

Women. Share of women among members of the cabinet (councilors, respectively).

Employees. Share of employees among members of the cabinet (councilors, respectively).

Professionals. Share of professionals among members of the cabinet (councilors, respectively).

Sources: Characteristics of politicians elected to the city councils and appointed as members of the executive committee are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Register of Local Politicians. See http://amministratori.interno.it/AmmIndex5.htm.

TABLE V.II

VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND DATA SOURCES: COVARIATES.

Geographic Covariates:

Municipal Area. The municipality area in Km^2.

Urbanization. The variable classifies municipalities according to three degrees of urbanization: (1) low, (2) medium, (3) high.

Seismicity. The variable classifies municipalities according to four degrees of seismic risk.

Sea Distance. The distance between the municipality and the sea, in Km.

River. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality is crossed by a river and zero otherwise.

Any Water Course. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality is bathed by any type of watercourse (river, lake or sea) and zero otherwise.

Seaside City. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality is on the coast and zero otherwise.

Share of Mountains. Share of the municipal territory with altitude $\geq$ 600 meters above sea level.

Altitude. The variable classifies municipalities according to five degrees of altitude class.

Population (Log). The log of the resident population in the municipality.

Sources: Geo-morphological controls are available from the Italian Institute of Statistics.
See https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/156224.

Mayors Characteristics:

Age The age of the mayor.

Schooling. The years of schooling of the mayor.

Women. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor is male and zero otherwise.

Employees. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the previous job of the elected mayor belongs to the category of low white collar and zero otherwise.

Professional. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the previous job of the elected mayor belongs to the category of high white collar and zero otherwise.

Second Term Mayor. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor was elected mayor also in the previous term and zero otherwise.

Sources: Mayors Characteristics are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Register of Local Politicians. See http://amministratori.interno.it/AmmIndex5.htm.

Electoral Covariates:

Turnout. The percentage of eligible voters who voted in the election.

Percentage of Votes (Mayor). The share of votes obtained by the mayor, over total number of votes.

Run-off. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor is elected at the second round and zero otherwise.

Run-off Alliances. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor forms formal alliances with parties between the first and the second round and zero otherwise.

Run-off Alliances with Seats. Dummy variable equal to 1 if parties that form formal alliances with the mayor have seats in the city council and zero otherwise.

Minority Ruling Coalition. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor does not have the majority of seats within the city council and zero otherwise.

Total Potential Voters Total number of eligible voters.

Total Number of Seats within the City Council. Total number of seats available in the city council.

Sources: Electoral covariates are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Election Archive. See http://elezionistorico.interno.it/.

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