

SUPPLEMENT TO “MULTINATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR LAW:
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON STRENGTHENING OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMITTEES”
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES

A: Truthful Reporting

IN ANY STUDY OF COMPLIANCE, one must be concerned about subjects’ incentives to misreport. In the context of a RCT, in order to bias estimates of treatment effects, the treatment would need to affect subjects’ propensity to tell the truth. In designing this RCT, I was keenly aware of these concerns, and I strove to design the data collection protocols in order to minimize experimenter demand effects and the potential for the OSH Committee Program to affect reporting. In this Supplemental Appendix, I report results for empirical tests of truth-telling by factories during the period of intensive enforcement by the MNCs for the treatment factories, when incentives for misreporting were arguably the highest. In Boudreau (2024), I provide a detailed overview of how the data collection protocol was designed to minimize experimenter demand effects.

During onsite visits, the research team collected data about other Alliance programs. In addition to shielding my interest in OSH committees, this approach allows me to test for effects on truth-telling and on “placebo” outcomes that I do not expect to be affected by the OSH Committee Program. Beginning with senior managers, I asked them questions about their factories’ progress with building safety remediation under their Alliance CAP. I also asked about their awareness of the Alliance’s worker helpline, including the number of recent reports about their factory to the helpline. I can verify the correct answers to these questions using the Alliance’s records. Thus, they allow me to test for nontruthful reporting and for managers’ awareness of their factories’ safety performance.

I also test for effects on three “placebo” outcomes related to factories’ compliance with other Alliance programs. First, the Alliance required that all factory personnel carry its worker helpline phone number card with their employee ID card. Survey enumerators were required to verify that survey participants matched the list of randomly selected participants, which they did by checking the participant’s ID card. While checking, they noted whether the participant carried the helpline card (without indicating this to the survey participant). Thus, I can test whether treatment factories differentially respond to being visited by the research team by increasing the share of personnel wearing the cards. I test for effects for workers and for lower-level managers. Second, I test for effects on factories’ maintenance of records of Alliance fire safety training implementation. The Alliance used a “train-the-trainer” model and required factories to conduct periodic training with workers and to maintain a training record using a provided template.

Table A.I presents baseline balance for truth-telling variables. In panel A, variables based on the senior manager survey, there is an imbalance on one variable: Underreporting of calls to the Alliance worker helpline by senior managers. It is important to note,

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TABLE A.I
 BASELINE BALANCE TESTS, TRUTH-TELLING.

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Control SD	(3) T-C Diff	(4) <i>p</i> -Value	(5) RI <i>p</i>	(6) Number of Factories
<i>Panel A: Senior Managers</i>						
Overreports CAP completion	0.300	(0.464)	-0.023	0.829	0.823	77
Underreports Alliance helpline calls	0.478	(0.511)	-0.348	0.006	0.006	50
Correctly reports whether CAP visit	0.220	(0.419)	-0.056	0.517	0.571	80
Aware of Alliance helpline	0.927	(0.264)	0.047	0.337	0.619	80
<i>Panel B: Compliance with other Alliance Programs</i>						
Share workers with Amader Kotha helpline card	0.827	(0.222)	-0.101	0.097	0.096	80
Share lower-level managers with Amader Kotha helpline card	0.725	(0.318)	-0.074	0.294	0.298	80
Alliance Safety Training Record	0.976	(0.156)	0.004	0.916	1.000	80

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of baseline differences between control and treatment groups. For each variable, I report the baseline control group mean in column (1). In column (2), I report the estimated coefficient for the treatment indicator from a regression of the variable on the treatment indicator and stratification variables. In column (3), I report the *p*-value for the treatment indicator calculated using robust standard errors. I also report the RI *p*-value based on 5000 draws. In column (4), I report the sample size for the regression. † Senior managers at 19 control and 13 treatment factories reported not knowing the number of calls or were unaware of the helpline.

though, that senior managers at 19 control and 13 treatment factories reported not knowing or were unaware of the Alliance's worker helpline at baseline. In panel B, there is a marginally statistically significant difference for the share of workers with the Alliance's worker helpline card. This difference shrinks and is no longer statistically significant if the outlier factory on worker variables is dropped.

Table A.II reports the results. Beginning with panel A, columns (1)–(2) report treatment effects on truth-telling. In column (1), the estimated treatment effect on overreporting the factory's progress with required building safety remediation is close to zero and not statistically significant. In column (2), managers at treatment factories are actually less likely to under-report calls to the Alliance helpline (not statistically significant). While the treatment does not affect managers' propensity to misreport, columns (3) and (4) show that it appears to increase their awareness of safety issues: Treatment senior managers are more likely to accurately report whether their factory was recently audited by the Alliance on building safety. They are also marginally more likely to be aware of the existence of the Alliance's worker helpline. These findings are not statistically significant, so should be interpreted as suggestive, but are consistent with stronger OSH committees' improving senior managers' information, for example, through the committee providing more reports, but not altering their incentives to misreport.

Turning to panel B, columns (1)–(2) show that there is no difference between treatment or control factories in the share of workers or managers found carrying the Alliance helpline card. Column (3) shows that there is no difference on the Alliance's requirement to maintain safety training records, although compliance with this requirement was already very high at baseline. Together, the results do not provide any evidence that treatment factories differentially respond to the data collection.

TABLE A.II
TREATMENT EFFECTS, TRUTH-TELLING.

	Truth-Telling		Awareness	
	(1) Over-Reports CAP Completion	(2) Underreports Helpline Calls	(3) Correctly Reports Wether CAP Visit	(4) Aware of Helpline
<i>Panel A: Senior Managers</i>				
Treat	0.001 (0.079) [0.992]	-0.149 (0.125) [0.227]	0.136 (0.107) [0.220]	0.060 (0.041) [0.042]
Control Mean	0.244	0.471	0.561	0.951
Observations	75	67	79	79
Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	N	Y	Y
	Worker Helpline			
	(1) Share Workers With Card	(2) Share Lower-Level Managers With Card	(3) Safety Training Record	
<i>Panel B: Compliance with other Alliance Programs</i>				
Treat	0.015 (0.036) [0.696]	-0.065 (0.052) [0.202]	0.023 (0.023) [1.000]	
Control Mean	0.838	0.799	0.976	
Observations	80	80	80	
Strata FE	Y	Y	Y	
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on measures of truth-telling and of awareness. Outcome variables are listed at the top of each column. Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets. Senior managers at 7 control and 5 treatment factories reported not knowing the number of calls or were unaware of the Alliance's worker helpline at the second data collection visit.


B: Figures and Tables

FIGURE B.I.—Most common two-word combinations in OSH committee meetings minutes. *Notes:* To prepare the meeting minutes for text analysis, I strip the text of factory and participant names, the phrases “[health and] safety committee(s)” and “meeting(s),” English language stop words, numbers, and punctuation. I also replace the commonly used acronym of “ppe,” which stands for personal protective equipment, and the complete phrase, with “pp equipment.” Finally, I “stem” words, or replace them with their root, using the Porter stemmer. These approaches are common practice in text analysis (Gentzkow, Kelly, and Taddy (2019)).




FIGURE B.II.—Correlation between WMS management index (excluding meeting question) and WMS meeting-related question, apparel firms in all countries. *Notes:* This figure presents a binned scatterplot of performance on the WMS excluding the meeting question and performance on the meeting-related WMS question. It includes all apparel manufacturers from all countries included in the WMS. The meeting-related WMS question asks whether performance is reviewed with appropriate frequency and communicated to staff (World Management Survey (2019)). The WMS management index is the average score on all other questions.

TABLE B.1
SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS.

	(1) Mean	(2) SD	(3) Minimum	(4) Maximum	(5) N
<i>Panel A: Primary outcome variables</i>					
Compliance index	-0.003	0.327	-1.148	0.624	80
Safety Indicators index	-0.018	0.512	-1.318	1.087	80
Job Satisfaction and well-being index	-0.049	0.466	-2.329	0.772	80
Number of employees [†]	1124	1315	50	7724	400
Gross wages (log) [†]	15.721	1.089	13.217	18.309	360
Labor productivity (log) [†]	0.921	1.036	0	4.673	385
<i>Panel B: Factory characteristics</i>					
Trade union at factory	0.025	0.157	0	1	80
EPZ(1 = Yes)	0.175	0.382	0	1	80
Sewing (only)	0.400	0.493	0	1	80
Number product types	1.325	0.792	0	4	80
Monthly absenteeism	4.588	3.845	0.074	26.916	80
Monthly turnover	3.605	3.913	0	29.948	80
Prop. employees visit medical clinic (daily) [†]	0.014	0.022	0.001	0.151	256
Participation in Alliance training	0.038	0.191	0	1	80
Number Alliance remediation visits	0.163	0.404	0	2	80
<i>Panel C: Worker survey respondent characteristics</i>					
Age	27.374	3.586	21.550	40.071	80
Proportion female	0.507	0.282	0	1	80
Education (yrs)	6.055	1.681	2.750	11.300	80
Tenure (yrs)	3.772	2.319	0.429	11.508	80
Prior industry experience (yrs)	1.545	1.034	0.060	5.679	80
<i>Panel D: OSH Committee President survey respondent characteristics</i>					
Age	39.228	8.604	22	62	79
Proportion female	0.114	0.320	0	1	79
Education (yrs)	16.038	1.713	8	18	79
Tenure (yrs)	7.206	6.321	0.083	25	79
Prior industry experience (yrs)	6.090	7.357	0	28.500	79
<i>Panel E: OSH Committee Worker Representative survey respondent characteristics</i>					
Age	27.234	5.153	19.500	48	79
Proportion female	0.449	0.336	0	1	79
Education (yrs)	8.380	2.826	0	14	79
Tenure (yrs)	4.926	4.040	0.375	24.125	79
Prior industry experience (yrs)	1.655	1.875	0	8.500	79
<i>Panel F: Senior Manager survey respondent characteristics</i>					
Age	43.500	8.657	24	68	80
Proportion female	0.025	0.157	0	1	80
Education (yrs)	15.975	1.974	8	18	80
Tenure (yrs)	8.872	8.385	0.083	42	80
Prior industry experience (yrs)	8.741	9.149	0	43	80

Note: The sample size changes across rows due to differential data availability.[†] Observations for these variables are at the monthly level. Employment is available for 80 factories, wages for 72, and labor productivity for 77. In panels D and E, the sample size is 79 factories because one factory was found not to have a true OSH committee at baseline.

TABLE B.II

BASELINE BALANCE TESTS, SECONDARY OUTCOME VARIABLES, OSH COMMITTEE PRESIDENTS AND WORKER REPRESENTATIVES, AND SENIOR MANAGERS.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Control	Control	T-C			
	Mean	SD	Diff	<i>p</i> -Value	RI <i>p</i>	Number of Factories
<i>Panel A: Secondary outcomes for workers, full sample</i>						
Perceived compliance and effectiveness index	0.000	(0.559)	-0.179	0.177	0.179	80
Perceived worker–manager relations index	0.020	(0.374)	-0.194	0.132	0.121	80
Worker empowerment index	0.022	(0.395)	-0.224	0.079	0.085	80
Worker organization awareness index	-0.025	(0.726)	-0.112	0.494	0.483	80
Number nonpecuniary benefits	6.492	(0.899)	-0.336	0.102	0.093	80
Monthly safety-related calls (per 1000 workers)	0.057	(0.332)	0.025	0.689	0.871	80
Monthly nonsafety-related calls (per 1000 workers)	0.422	(1.532)	0.130	0.719	0.933	80
<i>Panel B: Secondary outcomes for workers, dropping outlier on worker outcomes</i>						
Perceived compliance and effectiveness index	0.000	(0.559)	-0.139	0.278	0.275	79
Perceived worker–manager relations index	0.020	(0.374)	-0.157	0.212	0.193	79
Worker empowerment index	0.022	(0.395)	-0.152	0.152	0.148	79
Worker organization awareness index	-0.025	(0.726)	-0.071	0.657	0.649	79
Number nonpecuniary benefits	6.492	(0.899)	-0.322	0.119	0.119	79
Monthly safety-related calls (per 1000 workers)	0.057	(0.332)	0.025	0.689	0.872	79
Monthly nonsafety-related calls (per 1000 workers)	0.422	(1.532)	0.144	0.694	0.920	79
<i>Panel C: Secondary outcomes for factories</i>						
Average Weekly Working Hours	54.367	(5.749)	2.342	0.037	0.051	79
Efficiency (sewing section)	52.874	(14.383)	7.277	0.159	0.222	32
Defects per hundred units	3.221	(3.143)	-1.010	0.119	0.119	72
Supplier–buyer relations index	0.044	(0.587)	-0.147	0.335	0.385	72
<i>Panel D: OSH Committee Presidents</i>						
Age	40.073	(9.350)	-1.408	0.461	0.462	80
Proportion female	0.073	(0.264)	0.076	0.306	0.315	80
Education (yrs)	16.024	(1.851)	-0.105	0.799	0.814	80
Tenure (yrs)	6.459	(5.566)	1.364	0.334	0.342	80
Prior industry experience (yrs)	7.675	(8.802)	-2.651	0.095	0.104	80
<i>Panel E: OSH Committee Worker Representatives</i>						
Age	26.888	(4.393)	0.649	0.567	0.580	79
Proportion female	0.488	(0.330)	-0.065	0.401	0.404	79
Education (yrs)	8.394	(2.621)	0.068	0.915	0.921	79
Tenure (yrs)	4.542	(4.109)	0.734	0.406	0.436	79
Prior industry experience (yrs)	1.848	(1.891)	-0.410	0.334	0.338	79
<i>Panel F: Senior Managers</i>						
Age	43.244	(9.497)	0.432	0.823	0.833	80
Proportion female	0.024	(0.156)	-0.000	1.000	1.000	80
Education (yrs)	16.000	(1.844)	0.009	0.984	1.000	80
Tenure (yrs)	9.642	(8.998)	-1.864	0.302	0.299	80
Prior industry experience (yrs)	7.593	(9.540)	2.545	0.210	0.218	80

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of baseline differences between control and treatment groups. For each outcome, I report the baseline control group mean and SD in columns (1) and (2). In column (3), I report the estimated coefficient for the treatment indicator from a regression of the outcome or covariate on the treatment indicator and stratification variables. In column (4), I report the *p*-value for the treatment indicator calculated using robust standard errors. In column (5), I report the RI *p*-value for the treatment indicator based on 5000 draws. In column (6), I report the sample size for the regression.

TABLE B.III
SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: SECONDARY WORKER OUTCOMES.

	(1) Perceived Compliance & Effective Index	(2) Perceived Worker- Manager Relations Index	(3) Worker Empowerment Index	(4) Worker Organization Index	(5) Number non-Pecuniary Benefits	(6) Safety-Related Calls per 1k Workers Alliance Helpline	(7) Non-Safety- Related Calls per 1k Workers Alliance Helpline
<i>Panel A: Main treatment effects</i>							
Treatment	0.195 (0.122) [0.098]	-0.039 (0.081) [0.627]	0.067 (0.091) [0.470]	0.016 (0.079) [0.848]	-0.052 (0.168) [0.768]	-0.002 (0.075) [0.978]	-0.030 (0.101) [0.788]
Control Mean	-0.109	0.072	-0.178	0.073	6.802	0.107	0.303
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	400	400
Factories	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel B: Heterogeneous treatment effects by managerial practices</i>							
Below median	0.015 (0.143) [0.919]	-0.050 (0.117) [0.657]	-0.152 (0.115) [0.204]	-0.132 (0.065) [0.050]	-0.032 (0.273) [0.912]	0.006 (0.121) [0.969]	-0.028 (0.151) [0.873]
Above median	0.387 (0.178) [0.037]	-0.042 (0.120) [0.721]	0.257 (0.152) [0.071]	0.165 (0.139) [0.281]	-0.072 (0.201) [0.728]	-0.005 (0.074) [0.971]	-0.054 (0.135) [0.727]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.087 [0.124]	0.963 [0.957]	0.040 [0.027]	0.052 [0.074]	0.910 [0.917]	0.935 [0.946]	0.901 [0.911]
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	400	400
Factories	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Control mean, below median	0.012	0.122	-0.015	0.189	6.659	0.123	0.319
Control mean, above median	-0.205	0.034	-0.306	-0.017	6.914	0.094	0.291
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of short-run treatment effects on secondary outcome variables for workers. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each column is regressed on the treatment indicator, stratification variables, and a control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. The regression sample changes in columns (6) and (7) due to a different source of data for these outcomes. Each regression in columns (1)–(5) includes one post-treatment observations per factory, while those in columns (6)–(7) include five post-treatment observations per factory, where each observation is one month. In columns (1)–(5), robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. In columns (6)–(7), standard errors clustered at the factory level are reported in round brackets. RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets. For index variables, in all cases, higher values of the index correspond to more positive outcomes.

TABLE B.IV
LONGER-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: SECONDARY WORKER OUTCOMES.

	(1) Perceived Compliance & Effective Index	(2) Perceived Worker- Manager Relations Index	(3) Worker Empowerment Index	(4) Worker Organization Index	(5) Number non-Pecuniary Benefits	(6) Safety-Related Calls per 1k Workers Alliance Helpline	(7) Non-Safety- Related Calls per 1k Workers Alliance Helpline
<i>Panel A: Main treatment effects</i>							
Treatment	-0.082 (0.127) [0.506]	0.024 (0.093) [0.797]	0.288 (0.137) [0.035]	-0.007 (0.087) [0.936]	0.216 (0.159) [0.189]	-0.035 (0.036) [0.368]	-0.157 (0.180) [0.417]
Control Mean	-0.064	0.040	-0.414	0.087	6.727	0.071	0.530
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	240	240
Factories	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel B: Heterogeneous treatment effects by managerial practices</i>							
Below median	-0.204 (0.184) [0.316]	0.089 (0.124) [0.454]	0.086 (0.173) [0.622]	0.007 (0.125) [0.954]	0.478 (0.234) [0.060]	-0.043 (0.061) [0.537]	-0.287 (0.224) [0.222]
Above median	-0.006 (0.165) [0.978]	-0.034 (0.131) [0.807]	0.482 (0.195) [0.026]	-0.010 (0.130) [0.946]	-0.060 (0.224) [0.787]	-0.026 (0.035) [0.497]	0.030 (0.280) [0.928]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.427 [0.457]	0.469 [0.500]	0.122 [0.167]	0.923 [0.924]	0.107 [0.129]	0.935 [0.839]	0.901 [0.431]
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	240	240
Factories	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Control mean, below median	0.096	0.008	-0.304	0.074	6.555	0.075	0.436
Control mean, above median	-0.189	0.065	-0.499	0.096	6.863	0.068	0.604
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of longer-run treatment effects on secondary outcome variables for workers. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each column is regressed on the treatment indicator, stratification variables, and a control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. The regression sample changes in columns (6) and (7) due to a different source of data for these outcomes. Each regression in columns (1)–(5) includes one post-treatment observations per factory, while those in columns (6)–(7) include five post-treatment observations per factory, where each observation is 1 month. In columns (1)–(5), robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. In columns (6)–(7), standard errors clustered at the factory level are reported in square brackets. For index variables, in all cases, higher values of the index correspond to more positive outcomes.

TABLE B.V
TREATMENT EFFECTS: SECONDARY FACTORY OUTCOMES.

	Log(Output)	Mean Weekly Working Hours	Efficiency (Sewing Section)	Defects per 100 Units	Supplier–Buyer Relations Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Main treatment effects, short run</i>						
Treatment	0.0638 (0.3138) [0.835]	−0.4418 (0.5379) [0.475]	2.1598 (2.7669) [0.449]	0.2753 (0.2366) [0.259]	0.0417 (0.0522) [0.467]	0.0146 (0.0655) [0.844]
Control Mean	11.294	55.100	50.084	3.185	0.151	0.196
Observations	385	395	160	360	360	400
Factories	77	79	32	72	72	80
<i>Panel B: Main treatment effects, longer run</i>						
Treatment	0.0530 (0.3555) [0.885]	−1.4058 (0.6079) [0.019]	4.0820 (2.8229) [0.184]	0.1611 (0.1553) [0.324]	−0.0611 (0.0777) [0.516]	−0.1263 (0.1214) [0.347]
Control Mean	11.193	55.675	49.220	3.128	0.274	0.379
Observations	231	237	96	216	216	240
Factories	77	79	32	72	72	80
<i>Panel C: HTEs by managerial practices, short run</i>						
Below median	0.6005 (0.4783) [0.258]	0.8546 (0.7208) [0.258]	0.4139 (0.4180) [0.367]	0.0176 (0.0711) [0.821]	−0.0469 (0.0716) [0.557]	3.3101 (2.7296) [0.400]
Above median	−0.5045 (0.3992) [0.193]	−1.7611 (0.8002) [0.100]	0.1115 (0.1921) [0.575]	0.0725 (0.0776) [0.406]	0.0669 (0.1298) [0.628]	−0.4783 (2.7841) [0.903]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.090 0.087	0.024 0.046	0.526 0.553	0.610 0.648	0.474 0.470	0.317 0.447
Control mean, below median	385	395	360	360	400	160
Control mean, above median	77	79	72	72	80	32
below_cmean	10.467	53.733	3.180	0.204	0.224	46.226
abv_cmean	11.942	56.169	3.190	0.109	0.175	53.556
<i>Panel D: HTEs by managerial practices, longer run</i>						
Below median	0.5230 (0.5084) [0.400]	−0.7146 (0.6888) [0.370]	−0.0324 (0.2163) [0.894]	−0.1484 (0.1198) [0.334]	−0.3646 (0.1902) [0.081]	7.7540 (2.2503) [0.047]
Above median	−0.4647 (0.4788) [0.300]	−2.1157 (0.9015) [0.023]	0.3897 (0.1994) [0.094]	0.0612 (0.1049) [0.555]	0.1483 (0.1685) [0.376]	−0.5476 (2.6038) [0.896]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.090 0.200	0.024 0.280	0.526 0.223	0.610 0.236	0.474 0.050	0.317 0.103
Control mean, below median	231	237	216	216	240	96
Control mean, above median	77	79	72	72	80	32
Stratification variables	10.302	54.959	3.231	0.332	0.416	43.270
Control, baseline dep. var.	11.890	56.236	3.025	0.227	0.351	54.574
Product FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
baseline	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
product_fe	Y	Y	N	N	N	N

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on secondary outcome variables for factories. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each column is regressed on the treatment indicator, stratification variables, and a control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. Columns (1)–(2) also include product FE. The regression sample changes across columns due to different data availability for these outcomes. In columns (5)–(6), for the supplier–buyer relations index, column (5) includes all 3 variables in the pre-specified index, and column (6) drops the third, which is missing for 9 factories. Observations are at the factory-month level in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the factory level are reported in round brackets. RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets. For index variables, in all cases, higher values of the index correspond to more positive outcomes.

TABLE B.VI
PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN DEVIATIONS.

Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)	Modification
(1) The original PAP, which was posted on the AEA Registry in June 2017, included measures from survey question production line-level managers in the index of factory safety indicators (primary outcome variable). It also included survey measures from this group in certain secondary outcome index variables (perceived S C effectiveness and compliance index, worker- manager relations index, perception of worker capabilities index, and a perception of worker well-being index).	During baseline data collection, the research team determined that the line level managers were difficult to engage in surveys during the workday. As Safety Committees mostly aim to serve workers and to support senior management in occupational health and safety policies, after the baseline, I decided to remove variables from lower-level managers' survey data from these indices. I posted an updated PAP reflecting this change in December 2017.
(2) The S C Compliance Index included the following sub-variable: "President is management member and Vice President is worker member."	Due to an oversight, the information about the vice president's status was not collected for the first 57 baseline visits. I do not include this variable in the analysis.
(3) The S afety Indicators Index for the endline round included eight spotcheck variables that were only to be checked at endline.	Due to an administrative error, these additional items were not included in the checklist for the third visit for 14 out of 80 factories. As such, I do not include these variables in the analysis.
(4) The PAP indicated that I would also report outcomes measured at the individual-level at the individual level.	Consistent with best practice in econometric analysis for clusterd RCTs (Athey and Imbens, 2016), as the factory is the unit of analysis that is of interest, I omit individual-level regressions for space reasons.
(5) The PAP indicated that I would test for heterogeneous treatment effects by factories' location inside versus outside of an EPZ.	Ultimately, there were only 14 factories (7 treatment, 7 control) located in EPZs. There are large differences between these groups. As such, while I report baseline balance, I do not test for heterogeneous treatment effects by factory location.
(6) The PAP included hiring and machine downtime as factory- level secondary outcome variables.	I was not able to pilot the factory questionnaire until after I registered the PAP. I learned that many Alliance-covered factories did not systematically track these variables. Many factories in the sample had difficulty reporting them or indicated that they were unable to do. As such, I omit these secondary outcomes.
(7) The worker-manager relations index, a secondary outcome variable, include one variable to measure worker participation in strikes.	I decided that that participation in strikes was too sensitive to credibly measure in my setting, so I do not include the strike variable in the analysis.
(8) The PAP included an index of worker accidents and illness as a secondary outcome variable that included the medical clinic records, factory-reported illnesses and fires, and self-reported accidents and illness from workers.	The research team determined that factories' records of fires and accidents were often incomplete. For this reason, and due to the concern that the intervention may increase reporting of accidents by workers, I determined that the medical clinic records provide the most objective measure of accidents and illnesses.
(9) The PAP did not include using product type fixed effects in the labor productivity analysis.	In the paper, I report results with and without product fixed effects. The reason that I did not include them in the PAP was because the Alliance did not have records of factories' product types, and I did not anticipate that more than half of the factories would produce products other than RMG (e. g., shoes) or would process products (e. g., washing factories).

TABLE B.VII
 BASELINE BALANCE TESTS, SUBINDEX COMPONENTS OF PRIMARY OUTCOME INDEX VARIABLES AND
 SUBGROUPS FOR HETEROGENEITY ANALYSIS.

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Control SD	(3) T-C Diff	(4) <i>p</i> -Value	(5) RI <i>p</i>	(6) Number of Factories
<i>Panel A: OSH Committee Compliance</i>						
Formation subindex	0.016	(0.5480)	0.015	0.918	0.927	80
Operations subindex	-0.031	(0.5760)	0.121	0.336	0.332	80
Responsibilities subindex	-0.016	(0.4370)	-0.052	0.601	0.602	80
<i>Panel B: Safety Indicators</i>						
CAP completion subvariable	0.025	(1.0170)	0.126	0.571	0.561	80
Worker OSH committee awareness subindex	-0.010	(0.9090)	-0.554	0.029	0.030	80
Worker safety knowledge subindex	0.029	(0.8050)	-0.131	0.519	0.523	80
Senior manager awareness subindex	-0.015	(0.9960)	0.430	0.066	0.077	80
<i>Panel C: Worker Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being</i>						
Job satisfaction subindex	0.023	(0.7380)	-0.205	0.219	0.213	80
Mental well-being subindex	-0.019	(0.5630)	-0.205	0.281	0.304	80
Turnover subvariable	-0.014	(1.0220)	0.145	0.400	0.478	80
Absenteeism subvariable	0.000	(1.0000)	0.148	0.437	0.460	80
<i>Panel D: Below-median management subgroup, primary outcomes</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	0.046	(0.2840)	0.106	0.216	0.205	40
Safety Indicators	0.118	(0.4610)	-0.119	0.475	0.444	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	0.070	(0.4040)	-0.198	0.254	0.291	40
Log(Labor productivity) [†]	0.749	(0.9990)	-0.051	0.665	0.770	195
Log(Wages)	15.625	(1.1290)	0.007	0.983	0.982	190
Log(Employment)	6.297	(1.0740)	0.060	0.851	0.860	200
<i>Panel E: Above-median management subgroup, primary outcomes</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	-0.055	(0.2390)	-0.097	0.452	0.401	40
Safety Indicators	-0.082	(0.3410)	-0.009	0.956	0.959	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	-0.053	(0.3510)	-0.021	0.830	0.838	40
Log(Labor productivity) [†]	0.818	(0.8560)	-0.254	0.110	0.180	185
Log(Wages)	16.004	(0.9260)	-0.376	0.333	0.371	170
Log(Employment)	6.925	(0.8610)	-0.514	0.162	0.159	200

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of baseline differences between control and treatment groups. Panels A–C report differences for the subindexes and subvariables that comprise each primary outcome index. Panels D and E report differences between control and treatment groups within above- and below-median management subgroups for the HTE analysis. Columns (1)–(2) report the baseline control group mean and standard deviation. Column (3) reports the estimated coefficient for the treatment indicator from a regression of the subindex or subvariable on the treatment indicator and stratification variables. Columns (5) report the *p*-value calculated using robust standard errors and the RI *p*-value based on 5000 draws for the coefficient reported in column (3). Column (6) reports the number of observations in the regression.[†] The regression also includes product-type fixed effects. The trimmed sample drops factory-month observations in the 1st and 99th percentiles of labor productivity.

TABLE B.VIII
LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS (LATES): TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PRIMARY OUTCOMES.

	(1) OSH Committee Compliance Index	(2) Safety Indicators Index	(3) Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-Being Index
<i>Panel A: Outcomes measured using data collected during 3 onsite visits, short run</i>			
LATE	0.234 (0.060)	0.156 (0.069)	-0.161 (0.079)
Control Mean	0.029	0.108	-0.013
Observations	80	80	80
<i>Panel B: Outcomes measured using data collected during 3 onsite visits, longer run</i>			
LATE	0.214 (0.077)	0.082 (0.070)	0.114 (0.086)
Control Mean	0.109	0.153	-0.099
Observations	80	80	80
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y
	Log(Labor Productivity)	Log(Wages)	Log(Employment)
<i>Panel C: Outcomes measured using monthly data, short run</i>			
LATE	0.050 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.031)	-0.012 (0.023)
Control Mean	0.749	15.865	6.665
Observations	380	360	400
Factories	380	360	400
<i>Panel D: Outcomes measured using monthly data, longer run</i>			
LATE	-0.023 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.032)	0.003 (0.029)
Control Mean	0.813	15.866	6.670
Observations	228	216	240
Factories	228	216	240
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y
Product FE	Y	N	N
Dropping outlier	Y	N	N

Note: This table reports two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of treatment effects on primary outcome variables. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. In panels A and B, higher values of index variables correspond to more positive outcomes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In panels C and D, the regression sample changes across columns due to differential data availability. For labor productivity, results are shown dropping the control factory that partially shuts down during the study and including product type FE. Compliance in panels C and D is coded by month for the 4 factories that started the OSH committee program with substantial delays; the month when they started the program and later months are coded as treated. Standard errors clustered at the factory level are reported in round brackets.

TABLE B.IX
LEE (2009) BOUNDS FOR EFFECTS ON PRIMARY OUTCOMES.

	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
<i>Panel A: Short-run effects</i>		
OSH Committee Compliance Index	0.219 (0.077)	0.223 (0.073)
Safety Indicators Index	0.135 (0.088)	0.136 (0.072)
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being Index	-0.158 (0.081)	-0.156 (0.084)
<i>Panel B: Longer-run effects</i>		
OSH Committee Compliance Index	0.192 (0.091)	0.218 (0.086)

Note: This table reports Lee treatment effect bounds for sample selection. Outcome variables are listed on the left. Column (1) reports the lower bound. Column (2) reports the upper bound. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

TABLE B.X
SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: WORKER AWARENESS AND WORKFORCE COMPOSITION.

	(1) Aware of OSH Committee & Its Responsi- bilities	(2) Knows Factory has OSH Committee	(3) Knows How to Report Safety Concern to OSH Committee	(4) Reported num OSH Committee Responsibili- ties	(5) Reports Committee as Channel for Raising Issues	(6) Knows OSH Committee Members
<i>Panel A: Worker awareness</i>						
Treatment	0.053 (0.0249) [0.153]	0.040 (0.0177) [0.344]	0.011 (0.0232) [0.695]	-0.117 (0.1228) [0.339]	0.056 (0.0405) [0.710]	0.079 (0.0380) [0.041]
Control Mean	0.843	0.945	0.920	3.059	0.652	0.658
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	(1) Age	(2) Female	(3) Tenure	(4) Prior Exp.	(5) Yrs. Education	
<i>Panel B: Workforce composition</i>						
Treatment	-0.172 (0.5126) [0.883]	-0.041 (0.0368) [0.065]	0.241 (0.3188) [0.899]	0.042 (0.1832) [0.739]	0.264 (0.2669) [0.918]	
Control Mean	27.655	0.578	3.695	1.506	6.626	
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Control, baseline dep. var	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on worker OSH committee awareness variables and on workforce characteristics. In panel A, the first four columns report outcomes included in the Safety Indicators Index (prior to standardization for inclusion in the index). Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The regression sample is the same in all columns. The dependent variable in each column is regressed on the treatment indicator, stratification variables, and a control for the baseline value of the dependent variable (if available). RI p -values based on 5000 draws are reported in column 4.

TABLE B.XI
SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: OSH CHECKLIST.

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ITT Effect (SD)	(3) RI <i>p</i> -Value
Factory safety spot check index	0.000	0.229 (0.0894)	0.012
<i>Sewing</i> : Machines have guards <i>and</i> workers wear PPE [†] for their task	0.500	0.076 (0.1512)	0.602
<i>Cutting</i> : Machines have guards <i>and</i> workers wear PPE for their tasks	0.792	0.071 (0.1173)	0.553
<i>Dyeing and jobs handling chemicals</i> : Safety masks, goggles, gloves, aprons, and boots worn by workers handling chemicals	0.545	0.102 (0.2293)	0.668
All PPE appropriate size, functional, and well maintained	0.951	0.050 (0.0350)	0.490
Aisles clearly marked and markings visible	0.780	0.025 (0.0908)	1.000
Aisles clear of sewing scrapes and debris	0.951	0.048 (0.0338)	0.482
Aisles clear of obstruction	0.854	0.014 (0.0800)	1.000
Machines in good working order and dangerous parts properly covered	0.927	0.070 (0.0404)	0.248
Work stations maintained in tidy condition (no loose materials close to electrical appliances)	0.976	0.022 (0.0228)	1.000
One or more easily accessible first-aid kit in section	0.976	0.022 (0.0228)	1.000
Physical separation between storage and production areas	0.976	0.023 (0.0229)	1.000
Drinking water easily accessible for all workers	1.000	-0.025 (0.0252)	1.000
Drinking water provided appears clean (visual check)	1.000	-0.025 (0.0252)	1.000
Stratification variables		Y	

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on the spot check subindex and for each variable in the spot check index. Four variables on the spot check checklist drop from the analysis because all factories were found to comply with these variables (see the Supplementary Materials). Subvariables are listed on the left. Results are shown for the subvariables *prior* to standardizing them for inclusion in the index. Column (1) reports the control group mean of the outcome variable. Column (2) reports the estimated ITT effect from a regression of the outcome variable on the treatment indicator and stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. Column (3) reports RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets.[†] PPE stands for personal protective equipment. PPE vary by task and include equipment such as eye guards, finger guards, chain mesh gloves, goggles, boots, etc.

TABLE B.XII

SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: WORKERS' JOB SATISFACTION AND MENTAL WELL-BEING SUBVARIABLES.

	(1) Control Mean	(2) ITT Effect
<i>Panel A: Job Satisfaction</i>		
Self-reported job satisfaction (qualitative scale, coded 1–5)	4.845	–0.044 (0.0486) [0.375]
Respondent suggested/helped family or friends to get a job at their factory (previous 4 months)	0.599	–0.049 (0.0428) [0.257]
Respondent has thought about leaving their job at factory for safety-related reasons (previous 3 months)	0.015	0.019 (0.0101) [0.057]
<i>Panel B: Mental Well-being</i>		
Self-reported level of stress in life (qualitative scale, coded –1–(–5))	–1.761	–0.059 (0.0755) [0.480]
Self-reported perceived extent of control over their life (qualitative scale, coded 1–5)	4.082	–0.035 (0.0557) [0.541]
Self-reported perceived extent of control safety at factory (qualitative scale, coded 1–5)	4.369	–0.037 (0.0584) [0.539]
Self-reported stress about experiencing accident or injury at factory (qualitative scale, coded –1–(–5))	–1.488	0.039 (0.0599) [0.532]
Self-reported frequency of feeling unsafe at factory (qualitative scale, coded –1–(–5))	–1.236	–0.013 (0.0317) [0.686]
<i>Panel C: Turnover and Absenteeism</i>		
Turnover	3.356	0.053 (0.3108) [0.881]
Absenteeism	4.457	0.388 (0.2506) [0.162]
Observations		80
Stratification variables		Y
Contro, base. dep. var.		Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on each variable included in the worker job satisfaction and mental well-being index. Each panel reports the subvariable results for a different subindex. Subindexes and subvariables are listed on the left. Results are shown for the variables *prior* to orienting them to be unidirectional and standardizing them for inclusion in the index. Column (1) reports the control group mean of the outcome variable. Column (2) reports the estimated ITT effect from a regression of the outcome variable on the treatment indicator and stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. Column (3) reports RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets.

TABLE B.XIII
TREATMENT EFFECTS: BUSINESS COMPETITIVENESS OUTCOMES, PANEL REGRESSION MODEL.

	Log(Labor Productivity)				Log(Gross wages)		Log(Employment)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment × Post, short run	0.069 (0.046) [0.137]	0.068 (0.046) [0.139]	0.028 (0.042) [0.501]	0.028 (0.042) [0.501]	-0.017 (0.029) [0.580]	-0.017 (0.029) [0.580]	-0.013 (0.022) [0.581]	-0.013 (0.022) [0.581]
Treatment × Post, longer run	-0.021 (0.055) [0.693]	-0.022 (0.055) [0.687]	-0.054 (0.051) [0.249]	-0.054 (0.051) [0.249]	-0.006 (0.033) [0.856]	-0.006 (0.034) [0.856]	0.000 (0.030) [0.993]	0.000 (0.030) [0.993]
Control Mean	0.801	0.801	0.774	0.774	15.865	15.865	6.665	6.665
Factories	77	77	76	76	72	72	80	80
Observations	960	960	988	988	936	936	1040	1040
Factory FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Month FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Dropping partial shutdown	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of short- and longer-run treatment effects on labor productivity, employment, and gross wages using a panel regression model. Outcome variables are listed at the top of each column. Each column reports the estimated ITT effect from a separate regression. Columns (1)–(4) reports results for labor productivity. In columns (1)–(2), the sample is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile of all factory-month labor productivity observations. In columns (3)–(4), a factory in the control group that partially shut down during the study is dropped. Labor productivity is measured as the log of the physical quantity of output per person-hour. Person-hours are calculated as number of workers times the average weekly working hours times 4 weeks per month plus the number of management-level employees times average weekly working hours for managers times 4 weeks per month. The regression sample changes across columns due to differential data availability. Standard errors clustered at the factory level are reported in round brackets. RI p -values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets.

TABLE B.XIV
EX POST MINIMUM DETECTABLE EFFECT SIZES (MDEs): EFFECTS ON BUSINESS COMPETITIVENESS
OUTCOMES.

	(1) Control Mean (sd)	(2) MDE
<i>Panel A: Short-run effects</i>		
Log(Labor productivity) [†]	0.767 (0.859)	0.127
Log(Labor productivity), dropping factory that partially shuts down	0.749 (0.856)	0.094
Log(Gross wages)	15.865 (1.080)	0.081
Log(Employment)	6.665 (1.038)	0.060
<i>Panel B: Longer-run effects</i>		
Log(Labor productivity) [†]	0.821 (0.851)	0.107
Log(Labor productivity), dropping factory that partially shuts down	0.813 (0.918)	0.101
Log(Gross wages)	15.866 (1.069)	0.088
Log(Employment)	6.670 (1.056)	0.082

Note: This table reports ex post power calculations and minimum detectable effect sizes for labor productivity, employment, and wage outcome variables with 80% power at the 5% significance level. Outcome variables are listed on the left. Column (1) reports the control group mean and standard deviation in column. Column (2) reports the ex post MDE. †Reported MDE is for sample trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles of all factory-month observations for labor productivity.

TABLE B.XV

SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: LABOR PRODUCTIVITY AND UNIT PRICES, ESTIMATED WITH GIVEN NUMBER OF MONTHS LEAD ON OBSERVATIONS FROM CUSTOMS RECORDS.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Panel A: Log(Labor Productivity)</i>						
Treatment	0.072 (0.035)	0.058 (0.034)	0.043 (0.034)	0.026 (0.032)	0.014 (0.032)	0.005 (0.034)
Control Mean	0.730	0.738	0.749	0.754	0.769	0.773
Factories	76	76	76	76	76	76
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Product FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
PDS Lasso Selected Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N
Dropping outlier	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel B: Log(Labor Productivity)</i>						
Treatment	0.067 (0.039)	0.052 (0.038)	0.042 (0.036)	0.031 (0.035)	0.027 (0.035)	0.016 (0.038)
Control Mean	0.730	0.738	0.749	0.754	0.769	0.773
Factories	76	76	76	76	76	76
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	N	N	N	N	N	N
Product FE	N	N	N	N	N	N
PDS Lasso Selected Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dropping outlier	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel C: Log(Average Unit Price)</i>						
Treatment	-0.013 (0.050)	-0.001 (0.052)	-0.008 (0.051)	-0.056 (0.049)	0.016 (0.049)	0.064 (0.037)
Control Mean	2.336	2.332	2.324	2.330	2.327	2.299
Factories	53	53	52	53	53	53
Observations	257	259	254	253	255	250
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	N	N	N	N	N	N
Product FE	N	N	N	N	N	N
PDS Lasso Selected Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on labor productivity and on average unit prices, estimated using leads of 1 to 6 months for observations sourced from the customs records. The number of month leads are listed at the top of each column. In panels A and B, the outcome is the log of labor productivity. In panel C, the outcome is the log of the weighted average unit price, where the weights are applied by volume of the HS6 product code. Standard errors clustered at the factory level are reported in round brackets.

TABLE B.XVI

SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: OSH COMMITTEE MEETINGS, OSH COMMITTEE WORKER REPS, AND OSH COMMITTEE CHALLENGES.

	Meeting Frequency, Prev. 3 months		Log(Word Count)		Worker Rep Issue Prev. Meeting	Worker Reps' Participation in Meetings	President: Committee Needs More Support From Management	Worker Reps: Committee Needs More Support From Management
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Main treatment effects</i>								
Treatment effect	0.738 (0.194) [0.001]	0.683 (0.185) [0.001]	0.148 (0.174) [0.429]	0.223 (0.137) [0.091]	-0.005 (0.084) [0.964]	-0.045 (0.114) [0.724]	-0.058 (0.070) [0.342]	0.019 (0.074) [0.797]
Control Mean	1.268	1.268	5.264	5.264	0.268	2.878	0.146	0.200
Observations	80	80	74	71	80	80	78	79
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel B: Heterogeneous treatment effects by managerial practices</i>								
Below median	0.833 (0.273) [0.007]	0.839 (0.243) [0.003]	0.160 (0.238) [0.489]	0.179 (0.197) [0.378]	-0.160 (0.137) [0.246]	-0.266 (0.181) [0.208]	-0.176 (0.121) [0.134]	-0.007 (0.110) [0.951]
Above median	0.622 (0.289) [0.036]	0.507 (0.288) [0.079]	0.095 (0.270) [0.787]	0.278 (0.198) [0.133]	0.120 (0.096) [0.234]	0.170 (0.142) [0.247]	0.063 (0.098) [0.519]	0.047 (0.106) [0.676]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.596 [0.642]	0.382 [0.448]	0.862 [0.878]	0.724 [0.720]	0.106 [0.100]	0.082 [0.091]	0.155 [0.124]	0.721 [0.730]
Observations	80	80	74	71	80	80	78	79
Control mean, below median	1.222	1.222	5.353	5.353	0.444	3.000	0.222	0.176
Control mean, above median	1.304	1.304	5.204	5.204	0.130	2.783	0.087	0.217
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on OSH committees' meeting frequency and on the number of words in meeting minutes for OSH committee meetings. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each column is regressed on the treatment indicator and stratification variables. Even numbered columns also control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets.

TABLE B.XVII
SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: WORKER REPORTING OF OSH-RELATED ISSUES.

	(1) Reported Safety Concern, Prev. 4 Months	(2) Reported Concern to OSH Committee	(3) Reported Accident, to Survey Team	(4) Would Report Safety Concern	(5) Would Report Concern to OSH Committee	(6) Would Report Accident	(7) Would Report Accident to OSH Committee
<i>Panel A: Main treatment effects</i>							
Treatment	0.021 (0.018) [0.270]	0.024 (0.015) [0.118]	0.007 (0.008) [0.339]	-0.016 (0.009) [0.078]	0.056 (0.041) [0.181]	0.005 (0.006) [0.384]	0.001 (0.047) [0.975]
Control Mean	0.051	0.030	0.007	0.994	0.652	0.985	0.367
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel B: Heterogeneous treatment effects by managerial practices</i>							
Below median	-0.020 (0.023) [0.390]	-0.000 (0.021) [0.989]	0.003 (0.005) [0.646]	-0.022 (0.016) [0.198]	-0.037 (0.049) [0.404]	0.003 (0.009) [0.740]	-0.108 (0.062) [0.089]
Above median	0.069 (0.031) [0.014]	0.051 (0.024) [0.022]	0.014 (0.015) [0.356]	-0.010 (0.010) [0.261]	0.123 (0.065) [0.084]	0.005 (0.007) [0.507]	0.116 (0.068) [0.096]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.030 [0.018]	0.119 [0.094]	0.454 [0.474]	0.540 [0.559]	0.063 [0.059]	0.854 [0.862]	0.019 [0.018]
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Control mean, below median	0.064	0.033	0.005	0.994	0.763	0.989	0.449
Control mean, above median	0.040	0.027	0.009	0.993	0.566	0.983	0.302
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on workers' reporting of OSH-related concerns and accidents. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each column is regressed on the treatment indicator, stratification variables, and a control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets.

TABLE B.XVIII
SHORT-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: COOPERATION, COORDINATION, AND BARGAINING POWER MECHANISMS.

	(1) Management Cares Workers' Safety	(2) Management Would Address Unsafe Conditions	(3) Management may Punish for Reporting Injury	(4) Workers and Managers Improve Safety Together	(5) Management Would pay Medical Care	(6) OSH Committee can Affect OSH Policies	(7) OSH Committee Responsive to Workers' Concerns
<i>Panel A: Main treatment effects</i>							
Treatment	0.061 (0.036) [0.099]	-0.059 (0.062) [0.387]	-0.005 (0.013) [0.727]	0.093 (0.070) [0.198]	0.006 (0.032) [0.837]	0.032 (0.043) [0.485]	0.040 (0.050) [0.405]
Control Mean	4.018	4.316	0.038	3.278	0.809	0.540	4.195
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel B: Heterogeneous treatment effects by managerial practices</i>							
Below median	-0.014 (0.053) [0.804]	-0.161 (0.096) [0.147]	-0.020 (0.017) [0.248]	-0.057 (0.110) [0.638]	-0.014 (0.047) [0.762]	-0.039 (0.054) [0.466]	-0.095 (0.066) [0.161]
Above median	0.137 (0.052) [0.003]	0.041 (0.083) [0.636]	0.012 (0.022) [0.593]	0.250 (0.078) [0.002]	0.016 (0.043) [0.711]	0.094 (0.067) [0.191]	0.162 (0.068) [0.022]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.050 [0.040]	0.123 [0.166]	0.266 [0.264]	0.027 [0.032]	0.635 [0.639]	0.133 [0.135]	0.007 [0.010]
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Control mean, below median	4.056	4.383	0.045	3.326	0.851	0.596	4.282
Control mean, above median	3.989	4.263	0.033	3.240	0.775	0.497	4.127
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on measures of coordination and cooperation between workers and managers and on workers' bargaining power for OSH. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each column is regressed on the treatment indicator, stratification variables, and a control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets, RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets.

TABLE B.XIX
LONGER-RUN TREATMENT EFFECTS: SUBINDEXES OF PRIMARY OUTCOME INDEX VARIABLES.

Outcome Variable	(1) Control mean	(2) Treatment effect	(3) Robust std. err.	(4) RI p	(5) FDR p
<i>Panel A: OSH committee compliance index</i>					
Formation subindex	0.124	-0.047	0.139	0.739	0.327
Operations subindex	0.073	0.230	0.121	0.057	0.067
Responsibilities subindex	0.119	0.394	0.108	0.000	0.001
<i>Panel B: Safety indicators subindexes</i>					
Spotcheck subindex	0.028	0.077	0.085	0.383	1.000
CAP completion subvariable	0.437	0.146	0.087	0.099	1.000
Worker OSH committee awareness subindex	0.281	0.053	0.113	0.646	1.000
Worker safety knowledge subindex	0.241	0.167	0.160	0.321	1.000
Senior manager awareness subindex	0.238	-0.004	0.242	0.958	1.000
<i>Panel C: Workers' job satisfaction and mental well-being subindexes</i>					
Job satisfaction subindex	-0.211	-0.107	0.157	0.513	1.000
Mental well-being subindex	-0.130	0.351	0.187	0.066	0.345
Turnover subvariable	0.083	-0.015	0.064	0.858	1.000
Absenteeism subvariable	0.051	-0.017	0.052	0.769	1.000

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of treatment effects on subindexes of primary outcome index variables. Outcome variables are listed in each row. In all cases, higher values of the index correspond to positive outcomes. Each row reports the estimated ITT effect from a separate regression. All regressions include 80 observations. All regressions include stratification variables. With the exception of the spot check index, all regressions also include a control for baseline value of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are reported in column (3). RI p -values based on 5000 draws are reported in column (4). p -values adjusted to control the FDR across each primary outcome's subindexes are reported in column (5).

C: Robustness Checks for HTE Analysis

I report robustness checks for the HTE analysis by management practices (Section 4.4). First, there is correlation in factories' characteristics: Better managed factories tend to be somewhat larger and less compliant. This raises the concern that only one of these characteristics determines the intervention's effects. To examine this possibility, I regress each outcome on the treatment indicator, an indicator for each dimension of heterogeneity, and interactions between each dimension and the treatment. This specification demands a lot of the data, but it provides qualitative insight into the relative importance of each dimension. Table C.I presents the results. For all three primary outcome index variables, management practices remain important. For the safety indicators index, while the interaction term loses statistical significance, it is largest in magnitude.

Another concern is that MNCs may more intensively monitor less compliant factories and that this generates the heterogeneous effects. In this case, one would expect the Alliance to be more likely to audit factories that, at baseline, are less compliant with the OSH committee law. The Alliance audited five treatment factories during the study period, but all of the audits occurred after the 4–5 month data collection visit. As such, differential auditing could not drive the heterogeneous effect patterns in panel A of Table VII.

Finally, I use an alternative measure of management practices. This measure captures a different dimension of managerial capacity: HR management. I measure HR practices using an index of worker-reported HR practices and relations with managers that I pre-specified as a secondary outcome variable (see Boudreau (2024) for index components). I find a qualitatively similar pattern of heterogeneous effects using this variable as with my main measure. See Tables C.II and C.III below.

TABLE C.I

TESTING THE IMPORTANCE OF EACH DIMENSION OF HETEROGENEITY, POOLED SHORT- AND LONGER-RUN ROUNDS.

	(1) OSH Committee Compliance Index	(2) Safety Indicators Index	(3) Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-Being Index
Treatment = 1	0.138 (0.125) [0.357]	-0.045 (0.125) [0.741]	-0.327 (0.176) [0.083]
Treatment = 1 × Abv med Compliance = 1	-0.024 (0.120) [0.868]	0.073 (0.120) [0.588]	0.188 (0.151) [0.267]
Treatment = 1 × Abv med Size = 1	-0.089 (0.104) [0.515]	0.031 (0.129) [0.796]	0.162 (0.132) [0.209]
Treatment = 1 × Abv med Mgmt = 1	0.239 (0.113) [0.088]	0.157 (0.116) [0.241]	0.256 (0.143) [0.101]
Control Mean	0.069	0.131	-0.056
Observations	160	160	160
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y
Control, baseline dep. var.	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of HTEs for the pooled effects, controlling for all dimensions of heterogeneity. Each column in the table reports the estimated coefficients from a separate regression. The regression sample is the same in all columns in a panel. Standard errors clustered by factory are reported in round brackets. RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets.

TABLE C.II

BASELINE BALANCE TESTS WITHIN NONMANAGEMENT SUBGROUPS FOR HTE ANALYSIS, PRIMARY OUTCOME INDEX VARIABLES.

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Control SD	(3) T-C Diff	(4) <i>p</i> -Value	(5) RI <i>p</i>	(6) Number of Factories
<i>Panel A: Factory Size</i>						
<i>Below median subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	-0.007	(0.2514)	0.073	0.447	0.478	40
Safety Indicators	0.044	(0.3961)	0.042	0.809	0.823	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	0.004	(0.4419)	0.026	0.868	0.865	40
<i>Above median subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	-0.014	(0.2757)	-0.073	0.619	0.584	40
Safety Indicators	-0.027	(0.4200)	-0.139	0.394	0.416	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	-0.002	(0.3169)	-0.133	0.369	0.450	40
<i>Panel B: OSH Committee Compliance</i>						
<i>Below median subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	-0.183	(0.1509)	-0.184	0.065	0.031	40
Safety Indicators	0.030	(0.3539)	-0.111	0.501	0.473	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	-0.063	(0.3925)	0.052	0.651	0.660	40
<i>Above median subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	0.233	(0.1748)	-0.007	0.882	0.877	40
Safety Indicators	-0.029	(0.4787)	0.129	0.427	0.431	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	0.092	(0.3393)	-0.243	0.100	0.161	40
<i>Panel C: Location in EPZ</i>						
<i>EPZ subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	-0.142	(0.2664)	0.369	0.089	0.102	14
Safety Indicators	-0.058	(0.4272)	0.244	0.574	0.586	14
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	-0.104	(0.4362)	0.503	0.076	0.071	14
<i>Non-EPZ subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	0.016	(0.2560)	-0.019	0.827	0.818	66
Safety Indicators	0.019	(0.4065)	-0.103	0.431	0.418	66
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	0.022	(0.3648)	-0.173	0.151	0.137	66
<i>Panel D: HR Managerial Practices</i>						
<i>Below median subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	-0.019	(0.3079)	0.057	0.600	0.613	40
Safety Indicators	-0.183	(0.4423)	0.000	0.999	0.998	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	-0.011	(0.3929)	-0.250	0.122	0.148	40
<i>Above median subgroup:</i>						
OSH Committee Compliance	-0.004	(0.2210)	-0.061	0.603	0.593	40
Safety Indicators	0.169	(0.2925)	-0.079	0.573	0.574	40
Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being	0.011	(0.3679)	0.040	0.710	0.753	40

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of baseline differences between control and treatment groups. For each outcome, I report the baseline control group mean and SD in columns (1) and (2). In column (3), I report the estimated coefficient for the treatment indicator from a regression of the outcome or covariate on the treatment indicator and stratification variables. In column (4), I report the *p*-value for the treatment indicator calculated using robust standard errors. In column (5), I report the RI *p*-value for the treatment indicator based on 5000 draws. In column (6), I report the sample size for the regression.

TABLE C.III

OTHER HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS: PRIMARY OUTCOME INDEX VARIABLES, POOLED SHORT- AND LONGER-RUN ROUNDS.

	(1) OSH Committee Compliance	(2) Safety Indicators	(3) Job Satisfaction and Mental Well-being
<i>Panel A: Baseline Size</i>			
Below median	0.227 (0.071) [0.006]	0.084 (0.083) [0.308]	-0.114 (0.097) [0.272]
Above median	0.185 (0.083) [0.040]	0.125 (0.089) [0.172]	0.084 (0.093) [0.323]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.692 [0.748]	0.752 [0.737]	0.166 [0.125]
<i>Panel B: Baseline OSH Committee Compliance</i>			
Below median	0.231 (0.105) [0.027]	0.072 (0.089) [0.483]	-0.084 (0.097) [0.416]
Above median	0.175 (0.066) [0.016]	0.111 (0.076) [0.165]	0.030 (0.089) [0.745]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.654 [0.668]	0.748 [0.762]	0.397 [0.421]
<i>Panel C: Baseline HR Management Practices</i>			
Below median	0.149 (0.082) [0.067]	0.048 (0.072) [0.533]	-0.097 (0.106) [0.381]
Above median	0.284 (0.085) [0.002]	0.178 (0.089) [0.074]	0.064 (0.075) [0.416]
<i>p</i> -val, diff	0.273 [0.284]	0.253 [0.312]	0.231 [0.228]
Observations	160	160	160
Factories	80	80	80
Stratification variables	Y	Y	Y
Control, base. dep. var.	Y	Y	Y

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects on primary outcome index variables, pooling treatment, and post-treatment rounds of data. Each outcome variable is indicated at the top of the table. Each panel reports the results for a different dimension of heterogeneity. In each panel, the row reports the estimated treatment effect for the subgroup with below median baseline values of the heterogeneity variable. In each panel, the row reports the estimated treatment effect for the subgroup with above median baseline values of the heterogeneity variable. The final row in each panel reports the *p*-value of the difference between the estimated treatment effects for below and above median subgroups. All regressions include stratification variables and a control for the baseline value of the dependent variable. All subgroups have 40 factories. Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets. RI *p*-values based on 5000 draws are reported in square brackets. Index variables constructed using Anderson (2008) variance-covariance weighted index.

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