Credit Subsidy, rel. Pareto weight 0

December 22, 2017

1 Tables with Results

	No cred sub	Optimal policy	Optimal SS cred sub	Optimal Flat cred sub
ς_0	0.00000	-0.26667	-0.33684	-0.83333
$\bar{\varsigma}$	0.00000	-0.85556	-0.33684	-0.83333
Half life	-	2.00000	-	-
Welfare (weighted)	-5.86691	-5.07243	-5.29212	-5.07642
Welfare workers	-5.86691	-5.07243	-5.29212	-5.07642
Welfare entrepreneurs	-19.13708	-21.86548	-20.49767	-22.12306

	Constant ς_0	Constant $\bar{\varsigma}$
ς_0	-0.26667	-0.85556
$\bar{\varsigma}$	-0.26667	-0.85556
Half life	-	-
Welfare (weighted)	-5.37187	-5.07675
Welfare workers	-5.37187	-5.07675
Welfare entrepreneurs	-20.23473	-22.18775

Experiment	Total welfare	Worker welfare	Entrepreneur welfare
Optimal policy	0.02788	0.02412	-0.12752
Optimal flat cred sub	0.02774	0.02400	-0.13869
Constant ς_0	0.01728	0.01496	-0.05340
Constant $\bar{\varsigma}$	0.02773	0.02399	-0.14147

2 Parameters and functional forms

2.1 Functional forms etc.

- Occupational choice: No
- Workers save: No
- Decreasing returns to scale: Yes
- Productivity process: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, $d\log(z) = -\nu \log(z)dt + \sigma dW$
- Period utility function:

$$u(c,l) = (1-\gamma)^{-1}c^{1-\gamma} - \nu(l), \quad \nu(l) = (1+1/\chi)^{-1}l^{1+1/\chi}$$

- Production function: $y = F(z,k,n) = zA((k-f_k)^+)^\alpha((n-f_n)^+)^\beta$
- Credit subsidy schedule: $\varsigma_k(t) = \bar{\varsigma}_k + e^{-\gamma t}(\varsigma_{k,0} - \bar{\varsigma}_k)$

2.2 Parameter values

Pareto weight workers		1.000
Population share of workers	$popshare$	0.667
Total population	$popmass$	1.000
Discount rate entrepreneurs	ρ_e	0.050
Discount rate workers	ρ_w	0.030
Relative risk aversion	γ	1.000
Inverse Frisch elasticity	φ	1.000
Depreciation rate	δ	0.000
Death rate	θ	0.000
Fixed cost capital	f_k	0.000
Fixed cost labor	f_n	0.000
Financial constraint parameter	λ	2.000
Common TFP parameter	A	1.000
Capital share	α	0.297
Labor share	β	0.603
Returns to scale	$\alpha + \beta$	0.900
Interest rate	r^*	0.030
Effect of productivity on effective labor supply	η	0.000
Productivity drift parameter	ν	0.163
Productivity yearly autocorrelation	$e^{-\nu}$	0.850
Productivity standard deviation parameter	σ	0.300
Productivity mean	$\bar{z}$	1.148
Poisson arrival rate		0.100
Parameter of Pareto distribution of Poisson shocks		1.100
Contraction of initial distribution	χ	0.100

2.3 Iteration parameters

Number of grid points assets	I	200.000
Number of grid points productivity	J	30.000
Number of grid points time	N	150.000
Number of time periods	T	150.000
Max assets	a_{max}	350.000
Mean wealth relative to steady state		0.100
Range of initial credit subsidy rate tested	ς_0	[-0.300,-0.200]
Range of final credit subsidy rate tested	$\bar{\varsigma}$	[-0.900,-0.800]

3 Figures

Optimal steady state credit subsidy rate = -0.337



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3


Initial wealth distribution
Density
Wealth a
0.2
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350

Figure 4



Figure 5



Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8



Figure 9



Figure 10



Figure 11



Figure 12


Welfare by credit subsidy schedule, half life = 3
Total welfare
-5.074
-5.075
-5.076
-5.077
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
Initial credit subsidy
-0.8
-0.85
-0.9
Long-run credit subsidy

Figure 13



Figure 14 – Proportional deviations of optimal credit subsidy equilibrium from the laissez-faire equilibrium



Figure 15



Figure 16



Figure 17



Figure 18



Figure 19



Figure 20



Figure 21



Figure 22


Aggregate capital use
Optimal credit subsidy
No credit subsidy
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
50
100
150
Time

Figure 23



Figure 24



Figure 25



Figure 26



Figure 27



Figure 28

Figure 29